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Abstract 
 
Since the financial crisis in 2008-2009 China has shown a new assertiveness 
internationally, contradicting Deng Xiaoping’s earlier strategies of China to lay 
low internationally and develop economically. This new assertiveness is an often-
discussed subject and is often connected to the Chinese rise and a presumed 
pursuit of regional hegemony in South East Asia, rejected by Chinese officials. 
This paper aims on studying China’s new assertiveness on both a systemic 
international politics level and on foreign policy level to understand what drives 
this new assertiveness. Graham T. Allison used three explanatory models to 
examine the decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crises, and I have adapted 
his three models to China’s behaviour in South East Asia and complemented them 
with e.g. factors that affect decision-making and contemporary theories of 
hegemony. Using this method gave me the opportunity to challenge the notion of 
a Chinese pursuit of hegemony since the case of China contained several 
anomalies compared to the theoretical framework, which instead points to an All-
under-Heaven system emphasized by Chinese officials and scholars. The new 
assertiveness is explained mainly trough enhanced militarism, PLA influence and 
capacity, kept non-confrontational through e.g. Confucianism and Deng-ist 
advocates.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem 
Since the early 1980s, China’s economy has grown rapidly and continues to grow 
at a steady pace (Hong et al., 2012). China is now the world’s second largest 
economy after the United States, and the IMF indicates that China will most likely 
overtake the U.S. before 2020 (Shor, 2012, 158). According to recent reports from 
the World Bank, produced while writing this paper, China may surpass the U.S. as 
soon as this year (Bloomberg, 2014).   
In 1978 China opened up to the world, much thanks to the leader at the time 
Deng Xiaoping. In post-Maoist China, Deng created an “open door policy” 
aiming at increasing the liberalization and globalization of the Chinese economy 
leading to a boost in foreign trade and investment to stimulate economical growth. 
Deng’s grand strategy for China’s revival was characterized by caution on the 
international arena in order to maximize external viability and accelerate 
development (Green & Kliman, 2011). 
However, since the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, which China 
overcame well, China has taken a new approach on the international arena moving 
away from Deng’s low-profile-strategy, toward a more assertive “get something 
accomplished”-approach and demonstrated a new form of assertiveness; 
economically, militarily and politically (Cheng J., 2013, 53-54)(Yahuda, 2013, 
447).  
National politicians who still advocate Deng’s ideas and policy are fading in 
influence, whilst the PLA, and others, are becoming more and more independent 
due to heavy development, strengthening its importance nationally. The PLA has 
undergone, and is undergoing, a major refurbishment, with tremendously 
strengthened financial supplement, and new technological advances (Green & 
Kliman, 2011). The PLAN has new capabilities of both “green water” and “blue 
water”-operations and aircraft carriers; the PLAAF has been strengthened by 
grand purchases but also through the development of a combat aircraft with 
stealth technology J-20; a new network of satellites for monitoring and control is 
in service, and so on. 
The newfound assertiveness has especially taken the expression in its own 
geographical region, where it has led to actions that may be contrarian to 
international law; they have tried to reduce the freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea, have harassed foreign fleets in international waters, taken bold action 
in disputes regarding the groups of islands and reefs in the East and South China 
Sea, which is considered Chinese territory, the controversial air defence 
identification zone in the East China Sea, and so forth. This while Chinese 
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policymakers, media, and researchers still speak of China’s “peaceful 
development”, founded on Chinese Confucian philosophy.  
In the unipolar world system of today the U.S. has the power and/or ability to 
influence and enforce norms, ideas and institutions due to global hegemonic-like 
factors, being the most powerful state in the world. One example of this is the 
Obama administration’s pivot or rebalancing in Southeast Asia, where the U.S., 
based on liberal values, e.g. support regional institutions and enforce liberal 
capitalist trade by ensuring the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea 
(Pomfret, 2010).  
Even though China is not by classic claims part of Southeast Asia, its 
newfound assertiveness and foreign policy has affected the region immensely 
(Mahiar-Barducci, 2011)(Ignatius, 2014). Despite the fact that Chinese scholars 
and policy-makers regularly denies any Chinese hegemonic pursuit, China’s new 
assertiveness is often regarded as highly interconnected with its rise 
internationally and a frequent explanation in political magazines and media of its 
new assertive behaviour is a presumed pursuit of regional hegemony in Southeast 
Asia and the challenging of the declining U.S, which in turn deeply worries its 
neighbours (cf. Hsiang, 2008; Emde, 2012; Harris, 2005; Minxin, 2010; Hydarian, 
2013; Yan, 2014; Carpenter, 2011; Capaccio, 2009; Wang, 2011).  
 
To conduct this study I will try to examine the new Chinese assertiveness by 
searching for answers to the following questions: 
  
How does a regional hegemonic rise occur and affect the regional 
arena? AND 
Which national factors of decision-making drive the state to pursue 
regional hegemonic status? AND  
What signs are there to conclude that the assertiveness is related to a 
pursuit of hegemony? AND  
How can we understand and explain national decision-making versus 
international behaviour behind China’s new assertiveness related to its 
supposed pursuit of hegemony and/or peaceful rise? AND LASTLY 
Related to the results of the other four questions; why has China 
changed its behaviour towards a new non-confrontational 
assertiveness?  
1.2 Disposition  
In regard to my problem here is the planned procedure and disposition for the 
paper. I want to study the Chinese rise, as mentioned above, by analysing the 
phenomenon on two levels, both the systemic level and a foreign policy level. I 
will do this by using theories of international relations and hegemony to portray 
how we can explain the rise on an international level, and then move into China to 
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try to conceptualize how we can explain the Chinese assertiveness based on its 
processes of foreign policy decision-making.   
Graham T. Allison did this meritoriously in his study of the Cuban missile 
crisis, using three different models. I will take a similar approach but will modify 
Allison’s models some to make them more comprehensive, understandable and to 
fit this paper. I will also use dimensions, found in the political theories, to be able 
to further understand the Chinese rise and to highlight similarities and differences 
between theory and empirics.  
I will start of by giving my Aim and Objective, Method and Design, some 
Previous Research and some Delimitations in the continuation of chapter 1. 
Following in chapter 2 I will discuss my methodological foundation and 
introduce, what I call, Allison’s Method. Chapter 3 and 4 will be dedicated to the 
respective levels of analysis where theories and empirical material is introduced 
and analysed separately. In chapter 5 I will combine the results from chapter 3 and 
4 and give a dual-level analysis and show my final results.  
1.3 Aim and Objective  
In my view the Chinese rise will be one of the biggest questions of our time and 
academics dispute however this rise will not go peacefully – as realists often 
argue, whilst contemporary Chinese scholars regularly point towards the 
harmonious non-confrontational development that will ascend the region into 
prosperity (Green & Kliman, 2011, 33-34)(Mearsheimer, 2010A). No one can 
deny that China is pursuing a major power status regionally and internationally 
(Cheng J., 2013, 54). This rise is often understood as the Chinese development 
economically, military and politically, but also related to its new influence and 
engagement in the international arena and its new non-confrontational 
assertiveness regarding claims in the South and East China Sea (Ma, 2013, 155-
156). 
According to John Mearsheimer; China cannot rise peacefully, based on the 
containment of the U.S. and its allies (Mearsheimer, 2006)(Mearsheimer, 2010A, 
382). He believes that China will try to create a power-gap between its adversaries 
making itself sufficiently strong so that no other state in the region dares to 
challenge it (Mearsheimer, 2010A, 389-390). This does not necessarily mean that 
it will strengthen the military to the level that it will attack other states, but rather 
to be able to push and decide other states’ behaviour and to push the U.S. out of 
the region.  
The new Chinese assertiveness is often connected to four different factors that 
supposedly point to this assumption: first; that the rise of China do change the 
balance of power in the region; second; that its interests have expanded to include 
nearby seas and covered trade routes; third; the growth of nationalism among the 
population and officials; and lastly; the development of the PLA and sub-divisions 
and its ability to pursue national interests (Yahuda, 2013, 446).  
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My aim with this paper is to study this new assertiveness related to the 
Chinese rise. To understand whether China is pursuing hegemony or if other 
domestic factors influence their new assertiveness. I will try to reach the aim by 
studying China on two levels of analysis, both international system level and 
foreign policy level. Hopefully this will portray different aspects of the Chinese 
rise and improve understanding of the phenomenon. By approaching this study 
from a hegemonic view my objective is to problematize and portray the 
difficulties, problems, and gains with the Chinese rise and hegemony, based on its 
foreign policy, national affairs and concerns. To do this properly and as vividly as 
possible I will operationalize hegemony based on contemporary political theory, 
thus not initially giving any of them more relevance than another, merely showing 
different definitions and explanations. The overhead aim of this study is therefore 
two-folded, as the first aim is to study the Chinese rise towards hegemony based 
on assumptions of contemporary theories of hegemony on a regional basis, AND 
try to expose Chinese national factors leading to their foreign policy and new 
assertiveness.  
1.4 Previous Research 
China is a widely discussed subject and the headlines for this paper, China’s rise, 
new assertiveness and potential hegemony has been discussed and debated by 
several scholars from different schools and nationalities. Famous scientists as 
Mearsheimer, Buzan, Hurrell, Li Mingjiang, Storey, etcetera, portray their views 
of China’s rise based on theoretical assumptions, and e.g. if this will go peacefully 
or lead to a great war between superpowers. Studies explaining Chinese foreign 
policy and systemic approaches towards the rise and assertiveness are used to 
emphasize the importance of the rise and how China may affect the world and its 
surroundings (cf. Mearsheimer, 2010A; Yang, 2011; Yahuda, 2013; Fravel 2010). 
My belief is that there is a gap in understanding China. Western scholars adapt 
western theories and ideas, whilst many Chinese scholars emphasize and argue for 
a Chinese understanding of China and challenge western scholars with 
assumptions of tradition, culture and Chinese philosophy (cf. Emde, 2012; Yiwei, 
2009; Baogang, 2010; Tingyang 2006). I have not been able to find a study that 
examines China from both a systemic perspective and decision-making, it is 
always one or the other. In my belief a two-folded study has the potential to 
bridge the gap and give the rise of China a more thoroughly understanding, 
complementing contemporary theories of the phenomenon with Chinese ideas, 
and letting the two levels of analysis complement each other.  
By studying the phenomenon from both inside-out and outside-in I hope to 
contribute to the existing research by being able to combine, e.g. neorealist and 
neoliberalist, approaches of hegemony with factors that may affect Chinese 
foreign policy-making such as Chinese nationalism and Confucianism.  
Other phenomena, e.g. the rearmament in the region, the island disputes, 
etcetera, regarding Southeast Asia and the South China Sea are also widely 
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examined and local scholars as Geoffrey Till and Richard Bitzinger often do, but 
most of these studies use China as a explanation to the phenomenon rather than 
studying China in itself (cf. Storey, 2011; Bitzinger, 2010; Till, 2012).  
1.5 Method and Design 
Graham T. Allison wrote the book Essence of Decision analysing the Cuban 
missile crisis from three different perspectives. The book was later republished 
with co-author Philip Zelikow (1999). Allison intended to study and analyse the 
decision-making process behind the various actions during the crisis, by adapting 
three different models, derived from three different theories; rational actor theory, 
organizational theory, and a form of negotiation theory (Esaiasson et al., 2009, 
42). He then attempted to demonstrate the results from the three different 
perspectives and how it may have influenced the U.S. and Soviet’s actions during 
the crisis respectively (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, x-xi).  
Among the criticism of Allison’s models include the models mixed 
complexity (Bendor & Hammond, 1992). It is stated that the first model (though 
better in the second edition of the book), the Rational Actor Model (RAM) is too 
simple in its design and only designed to later be wrestled down by the latter two 
(Rosati, 2001). Model II and III, especially model III, are said to be too complex 
and convoluted and that they rather fail to produce the core of the problem 
(Munton, 2012)(Rosati, 2001). The aim in my models will be to conceive, or 
adapt, existing political theories of international relations, and what drives the 
actions and interaction of states based on some of the core assumptions I could 
observe in Allison’s models, and thereby retain the core of each model. The 
Rational Actor Model will thereby be modified and enhanced by a diversification 
of different theories of hegemony that still emphasize the core assumptions of 
Allison. The latter models will be complemented by other similar theories of 
foreign policy-making to hopefully lessen the complexity of the models, making 
them more understandable. Since both of the latter examines the same level, 
Model II and III will be joined together in one chapter based on their overarching 
similarity, whilst the first model will have a chapter of its own.  
The aim of Essence of Decision is not to fully explain the Cuban missile crisis, 
but rather to understand how foreign policy decision-making is perceived and 
conducted in critical situations (Gustavsson, 2006, 270). Allison’s models are 
constructed as explanatory rivals, diversified through different theoretical 
assumptions of how decision-making occur (Herrman M., 2001, 49). In difference 
with Allison my overall aim is to understand and explain the Chinese rise, using 
the theories at hand, rather than contributing with more knowledge about 
decision-making in general. Thereby I intend to, instead of making the 
explanatory models rivals, let them complement each other in how to understand 
Chinese foreign policy. Following Jakob Gustavsson’s words, that an important 
ambition is to combine theories and explanatory factors on different levels of 
analysis to vividly and compellingly explain international events (Gustavsson, 
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2006, 271-272). This can also help us understand how uncertainties of policy 
makers can react to different scenarios on the system level (DeRouen & Mintz, 
2010, 6). 
Allison’s method will also be complemented with theoretical dimensions 
found diversifying the different theories to further emphasize the study of the 
Chinese rise. These dimensions will be portrayed sequentially in the study only to 
make the study more colourful, vivid and intersubjective verifiable.  
Kenneth Waltz criticise Allison that his study of the Cuban missile crisis is 
rather a dyadic study of both international politics and foreign policy-making 
(Waltz, 1986, 122). This is not problematic for my study but to the contrary gives 
a possibility of studying the phenomenon on two levels.  
1.6 Delimitations  
Knowing your limitations is essential to a good study, and I will try to motivate 
mine and some delimiting choices made. First of all, the latter part of the foreign 
policy of the Chinese rise is heavily based on actors’ ideas, values and relations. I 
am aware that I will not be able to follow the decision-making process at a close 
distance, as Allison did during the Cuban missile crisis. I will not be able to have 
a sit-down with the Chinese president Xi Jinping or other power-holders of 
Chinese politics, which forces me to limit my study to mainly secondary sources 
and other scholars’ evidence of Chinese behaviour. This also means that during 
this study I have to make some theoretical or cognitive assumptions along the 
way. Meaning that if a particular theory X of foreign policy-making states that 
behaviour Y is because of factor Z, I must assume that this is also the case with 
China. Especially during the latter two models, since my insight is limited to, as 
mentioned, nothing other than the actual actors’ words.  
Using Allison’s method is delimitation in itself since it gives the framework of 
analysis for the study. Many more aspects could possibly be included in the study 
and would possibly show interesting results, but then it wouldn’t be related to 
Allison’s three models. Thus, since I accept Waltz critique that Allison’s study 
actually studies the phenomenon on two different levels, both systemic and 
reductionist, many more theories could possibly explain and examine the Chinese 
rise on the international level. But limiting it to Allison’s core assumptions makes 
the choice easier.   
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2 Methodology 
A study that applies theories to a certain case to analyse a certain phenomenon or 
sequence is often regarded as a theory consuming (Esaiasson et al., 2009, 42). 
Often one case is analysed by applying a number of different theories to examine 
both how the phenomenon can be understood and explained, but also which 
theory that has the highest explanatory power of the case (Esaiasson et al., 2009, 
43). In difference with a theory testing study, which primarily, as the name tells 
us, aims at using a case or cases to dismantle a certain theory, the theory 
consuming study aims at explaining a certain case with different theories 
(Esaiasson et al., 2009, 42-43). The difference between the two is small but can be 
found in the motivation of the focal point. What is primarily to be studied? If, as 
in my case, the phenomenon is the primary focus and explanatory factors 
secondary; the study is theory consuming (Ibid.).  
My study is to be mainly explanatory in trying to explain the Chinese rise, but 
it will also include certain descriptive ventures, since it is my belief that 
explaining without describing is a fruitless affair. Analysing the Chinese rise 
without first describing the phenomenon and different factors related would lead 
to a rickety explanation. Like explaining a math problem without first describing 
the value of each number. An explanatory study aims particularly to answer 
distinct questions of why and not questions of where, who, what and when as with 
a descriptive study (Esaiasson et al., 2009, 37). Hopefully by answering questions 
of descriptive nature will help me understand the question of why. A study is 
often both deductive and inductive in different stages of the process (Goldmann et 
al., 1997, 38-39).  
2.1 Case Study Design 
Case studies are good for testing theories (Goldmann et al., 1997, 57). By 
applying a theory on a certain phenomenon the theory might prove to be correct or 
not. My view is that it is the same with a theory consuming study, using just one 
case and studying from a theoretical framework.  
One advantage with using a case study is that a phenomenon can be explored 
and analysed through a multitude of views and methods and thereby giving the 
possibility to dig deeper and get a more colourful picture (Goldmann et al., 1997, 
56-57). By analysing just one phenomenon it is possible to gain a thorough 
understanding of the phenomenon that may give valuable understandings and 
knowledge.  
  9 
Case studies almost always contain comparative elements (Esaiasson et al., 
2009, 121). While still focusing on a certain case or phenomenon in a limited 
context some forms of comparisons are almost always present. As in my case 
when trying to understand a certain change and the Chinese rise the comparison is 
found in a sequential perspective connected to the “new” assertiveness of China 
(Ibid.). And when implementing a variable before and after a certain point in time 
we automatically have two units of analysis.  
One common critique against case studies is the limitation of making 
generalisations based on just one case (Goldmann et al., 1997, 56). From a 
statistical perspective this may be true, but generalisations from a case study take 
a more analytical conceptual shape (ibid.).  
2.2 Qualitative – Quantitative   
Quantitative and qualitative studies are often portrayed as each other’s adversaries 
(Allwood, 2011, 1417-1419). Based on different ontological and epistemological 
settings they are methods for scientists with different views of the world and 
knowledge (Ibid.). Quantitative methods are most often paired with empirical 
positivists, pointing towards large N statistical studies, whilst qualitative 
constructivists or hermeneutics approach with a mind-dependent intensive view of 
a phenomenon (Allwood, 2011, 1419-1422). As the names of the two tell, 
quantitative implies as many cases as possible to be able to generalize the results, 
whilst qualitative suggest higher quality and intensity in fewer cases. Qualitative 
methods are suitable for trying to capture different contexts or processes, since 
they mainly focus on patterns of contextual issues and meanings (Devine, 2002, 
199).  
Even though I will focus on only one case I believe my study to be a 
quantitative and qualitative mixture since I regard that to be the best approach to 
understanding the phenomenon. My variables used are found within both mind-
dependent and empirical sources of information and address both hard and soft 
data (Marsh & Read, 2002, 234-235). I will use both empirical data found in 
mainly secondary sources, but since decision-making also include ideas, emotions 
and psychological factors it is impossible to exclude qualitative secondary data as 
well (Allwood, 2011, 1422). I do not regard this as a problem but rather a 
possibility to enhance the study and enable a more thorough analysis.  
The gap between quantitative and qualitative methods, and the notion of the 
methods usage independent of each other, is commonly challenged (Marsh & 
Read, 2002, 236)(Allwood, 2011). Many researches today instead claim that 
combining the two gives the study more validity and allow the student to examine 
more aspects of the phenomenon (Marsh & Read, 2002, 237).  
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2.3 Using Three Perspectives – Allison’s Method  
My method of choice is to apply Allison’s tri-perspective method analysing the 
same phenomenon from three different perspectives, with some modifications. I 
will apply his Rational Actor Model onto theories of hegemony and its effects to 
be able to understand and analyse the Chinese rise on an international level. Thus 
using the findings from the theories to construct different dimensions to be able to 
vividly examine China in a global and regional context.  
Allison’s assumptions from each of his models will be framing my models 
whilst some modifications will take place to make the models applicable to 
hegemony and China. I will not use the models the same way as Allison did 
analysing the Cuban missile crisis in an action – reaction template but rather on 
the sequential rise and status of hegemony. Thus the models gives me a possibility 
to study China initially from an outside-in systemic perspective looking at the 
international level followed by a more reductionist inside-out perspective of 
Chinese foreign policy.   
2.4 Dimensions 
As a tool of analysis I will use dimensions to try to portray China’s new 
assertiveness and rise. Dimensions can be used as a framework to understand, but 
also sort, the empirical data of the case (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, 164-165). By 
using comprehensive and mutually exclusive dimensions it allows the opportunity 
to portray China’s rise in an international context based on theoretical 
assumptions (Beckman, 2005, 26). By constructing these dimensions based on my 
findings in the theories used I will be able to codify China centred on empirical 
facts.  
The usage of dimensions also allow for comparisons within the same case, 
showing changes in time as China at time A and time B might place itself 
different in the same dimension showing a change in behaviour internationally 
(Bergström & Boréus, 2005, 172). Dimensions are in general quite easily 
constructed for use as frameworks or screens since they do not need the carefully 
detailed precision as e.g. ideal types do (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, 172).  
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3 International Systemic Analysis – 
Rational Actor Model   
In his book, Allison exemplifies RAM by mentioning the following political 
theories: realism, neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, 30-40). I have chosen to examine hegemony through the eyes of neorealism 
and neoliberalism, and a dyadic approach to the theory of hegemonic stability (or 
Hegemonic Stability Theory). These have been chosen since they are strong in the 
contemporary, and recent, discussion of hegemony and fit Allison’s assumptions 
of the actor.  
I mainly discuss hegemony as established rather than the ascendance of the 
same, much because of that this is what the chosen theories do, thus I emphasise a 
sequential notion meaning that if hegemony is regarded as e.g. the state with most 
military power, the most colourful explanation of the rise is to focus on military 
enhancement.  
3.1 Model I - Rational Actor Model 
Allison’s first model the Rational Actor Model, RAM, treats the state as a 
perfectly rational actor, with full information about the situation treated (Allison 
& Zelikow, 1999, 13-19, 64). States act rationally in the international arena by 
attempting to maximize profits, and strive to achieve given goals (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, 13, 17). Thereby states encounter each situation by calculating 
costs against potential benefits and choose the option that gives the highest pay-
off, thus maximize the strategic goals (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 18, 24). When 
given various options to the situation at hand the state selects the option that is 
most favourable and closest to their goals, which in turn might be national 
security, resources, power, etcetera. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 17). 
Allison points out that the model is widely used by researchers today (1999) 
and adapted by the various schools of political science in the analysis of 
international relations (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 15, 26). As mentioned, Allison 
accounts this by illustrating the rationality of classical realism, neorealism, 
institutionalism and liberalism. The joint equal for these four is that the state is 
considered as the main actor in international relations and that their national 
interests control their behaviour (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 34). However, they 
differ in the level of rationality and he highlights realism as perfectly rational, 
where the state’s self-interest and option with the highest benefit will drive the 
state’s actions, whilst within institutionalism and liberalism states are looking for 
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a common good, a positive sum game, and that states can choose the next best 
option to achieve the highest common good (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 26-39). 
Allison illustrate the core functions of the rational actor model by pointing out 
that one can assume that: the state is a single and unified actor, the state has a 
single utility function, the state acts in relation to threats and opportunities, as well 
as the state's action is to maximize value and utility (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 27, 
Figure 2). 
3.2 Hegemony 
Analysis of the most dominant state in the system – the hegemon – is a popular 
study by scholars of political science (Brooks, 2012, 27).  Hegemony is a widely 
debated term and used in different ways by different schools of international 
relations. Though what unites most all of these theories, according to Andrew 
Hurrell, is that hegemony is based on constant negotiations between the weak and 
the strong, but where the means might differ accordingly to different 
understandings (Hurrell, 2007, 270). He acknowledges the balance of consent and 
coercion as the most vital of the definition of hegemony, the balance of direct and 
indirect power versus the provision of some action autonomy and respect for the 
interests of weaker states (ibid). Thus, different schools of theory emphasize 
different levels of focus on each side of this balance. The hegemonic form of the 
international society can be an explanatory factor on the system level. Different 
forms of hegemonies can explain different forms of international systems and 
institutions (Keohane, 1986, 147-148). 
The most powerful state must actively accept its own hegemony in regards of 
it both controlling and stabilizing the international system to be considered a 
hegemon and for the hegemonic system to arise  (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 14). 
Since potential states with the capacity to be a hegemon might decline this 
opportunity due to e.g. national protectionism (ibid.)(Milner, 1998, 112). Jungblut 
& Sacko depicts that the most powerful state requires three elements to be 
considered an international hegemon (2004, 15). These elements are: hegemonic 
power, hegemonic will, and international acceptance. A hegemonic state 
dominates its surrounding whilst a potential hegemon has the capacity to out-
power other regional powers but does not necessary do so (Godwin, 2004, 83).   
According to Gramscian notions of hegemony the hegemon in the 
international arena is not necessarily a state, but rather the dominant political and 
ideological force in the international community (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 12). 
This dominating force is able to sustain a dominant role in world politics based on 
its hegemonic dominance of values. The values of this leading class are 
acknowledged as good and correct whilst values from weaker classes, or states, 
are regarded as bad and false, whereas the dominant force will impose their values 
to others (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 12-13). As Gilpin argues that the creators of 
e.g. neoliberal regimes are hegemonies, Gramsci adds that its creation is an 
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extension of the governing international elites ideological views and values 
(Burmeister, 2003, 2).  
3.2.1 Neorealism on Hegemony  
A Neorealist theorist explains the international system as anarchical and 
competitive and that state behaviour is easiest understood by examining the 
system (Keohane, 1986, 13-15). Since the system is anarchical and not 
hierarchical and states are rational and the thing separating states is the division of 
power, the system is not stable until it balances itself through a balance of power 
(Hurrell, 2006B, 5-6)(Mearsheimer, 2001, 2).  
According to Kenneth Waltz theories are either reductionist or systemic 
(Waltz, 1986, 47)(Waltz, 1979, 18-39, 60-64). Neorealists or structural realists 
argue that to understand the international system we must be aware of the units 
but especially understand the structures (Waltz, 1986, 52). “It is not possible to 
understand world politics simply by looking inside of states.” (Waltz, 1986, 52). 
Waltz stipulates that it is needed or the best practice to study causes on both unit-
level and system-level to vividly understand and explain changes and continuities 
within a system (Waltz, 1986, 51-56, 331).  
Structures work to keep outcomes within narrow ranges and constrain 
different conditions (Waltz, 1986, 62). According to Waltz – it is agents, etcetera, 
within the structure that operates for a particular purpose narrowing the ranges, 
within a larger system. Thus constraining unobservable structures are selectors, 
constraining by rewarding and punishing behaviour within the system (Waltz, 
1986, 62-63). “Agents and agencies act; systems as a whole do not. But the 
actions of agents and agencies are affected by the system’s structure. In itself a 
structure does not directly lead to one outcome or another. Structure affects 
behaviour within the system, but does so indirectly.” (Waltz, 1979, 74).  
Kenneth Waltz thus emphasises that in regard to the structure of the 
international system, states should be defensive not trying to maximise their 
power in pursuit of hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2010B, 78). Instead states should try 
to balance the system to have the biggest chance of surviving. Another part of 
neorealism does not agree with Waltz on this notion, and urges states to do the 
exact opposite, offensive realists. John Mearsheimer and other offensive realists 
understand that the best way of surviving is to maximise power, and that 
hegemony is not necessary based on the fact of domination or conquest 
(Mearsheimer, 2010B, 78). Mearsheimer argues that multipolar systems are more 
dangerous than bipolar systems, since they have a bigger chance of war, and 
multipolarity with especially powerful states are the most dangerous systems of 
all (2001, 5). Since the structure of the system drives states towards striving for 
more and more power, a potential hegemon will do what it can to secure its own 
survival (Mearsheimer, 2001, 20-21). Your friends today might be your enemies 
tomorrow, and no rational state would miss the chance of securing hegemony on 
the argument that they have enough power to suffice its own security today, even 
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if that means war and conquest against other states (Mearsheimer, 2001, 33-35, 
147-148).  
In the view of neorealists, power is not the end-objective; survival is. Thus, 
power is a mean towards the goal – survival. Power is based on states’ material 
capabilities, and can be divided into existing power; e.g. military resources, 
technology, economics, and latent power; potential power in a situation of 
competition (Mearsheimer, 2010B, 78-79). Military power is by far the most 
important source of power for offensive realists, whereas land, air and naval 
forces constitute the armies of a state’s military power, thus a source power in the 
international community (Mearsheimer, 2001, 43)  
Offensive realists deny the statements of defensive realists that states should 
not pursue hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2010B, 83). They accept the notion of the 
balancing system, but explain it as ineffective (ibid.). They claim that history has 
shown that the victor of war most often has been on the initiating side, and 
regardless that hegemony is hard to reach – it is possible. So they stipulate that 
great powers are always searching for the opportunity to maximize its power to 
reach hegemony, though raising the stakes with risks of central war (ibid).  
The critical explanatory difference between offensive and defensive realist 
therefore is the notion of rationality of states, as a defensive realist hails the state 
that balances as rational, while deems the state that pursue hegemony as irrational 
(Mearsheimer, 2010B, 84). They instead try to explain these inaccuracies by 
adapting domestic-level theories as organizational theory, domestic regime type, 
etcetera. Offensive realists instead claims that states who act in non-accordance or 
contradictory to their structural arguments act in an unwise way, and they lack the 
back-up plan of adapting a theory of domestic factors or foreign policy (ibid).  
The hegemon can enforce its will thru material power, e.g. military might, by 
coercive behaviour, acting unilaterally without consent of other states (Pedersen, 
2002, 682). By military supremacy the hegemon can act predatorily unilateral in 
accordance with its goals and objectives securing its own survival and socio-
political and economic resources (Warner & Zawahri, 2012, 218). Neighbouring 
weaker states are believed to be able to group together and ally against the 
hegemon, to try to balance it, or to bandwagon with the hegemon (Hurrell, 2006B, 
6, 12). This often leads to sub-regional groupings among the weaker states to 
counter the potential threat of the hegemon (Pedersen, 2002, 681). So forth 
weaker states may approach other major powers in the system, hedging against 
the hegemon or become a follow-state trying to gain as much as possible in the 
existing zero-sum game (Hurrell, 2006B, 12)(Mearsheimer, 2001, 157-159).  
3.2.2 The Neoliberalist Critique  
Neoliberalism is very similar to neorealism on several accounts. First of all it also 
acknowledges the international system as anarchical and not hierarchical 
(Sterling-Folker, 2010, 119). Secondly it treats the state as a unified rational actor 
and agrees with neorealism on the fact that international cooperation historically 
has shown hard to establish (Sterling-Folker, 2010, 117-118). Neoliberalists 
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aimed to understand and challenge the pessimistic realist notions by using the 
same framework, adapting their assumptions (Sterling-Folker, 2010, 118). Though 
the big difference to the neorealist international theory – of states maximizing 
power or balancing to stabilize anarchy – neoliberalists, or institutionalists, will 
argue that states will produce a set of formal and informal rules – institutions – in 
which their behaviour is limited, yet serves their national interest (Duffield, 2009, 
642). By – solving coordination problems, acting as focal points – solving 
cooperation problems, acting as rules of state behaviour – and by reducing 
uncertainty of other states incentives, by enhancing communications and 
transparency between states – institutions broaden the sets of actions for states 
minimizing the risks of extreme assertiveness, aggression, and elevate cooperation 
and interdependens (Duffield, 2009, 642-643). Robert Keohane portray 
institutions as a persistent and connected set of rules that not only define and 
restrict state behaviour but also allows and creates expectations of state behaviour 
(Ericson, 2009, 59-60).  
Another diversification between the two neo-theories mentioned, is the view 
and potential of anarchy (Sterling-Folker, 2010, 119). The neorealist theory is 
very pessimistic about the state of anarchy and claim that due to the fact of it 
being an all-encompassing unchanging condition, where states cannot control the 
outcomes and definitely ensure their survival, states get paranoid and afraid, 
leading to the quest for power (ibid.). Neoliberalists argue that anarchy rather is a 
vacuum that is to be gradually filled with norms, rules and institutions (ibid.).  
Institutions per se are often influenced and constituted by their implementation 
and their “business”, as they gain legitimacy from their contribution and purpose 
(March & Olsen, 2009, 5-10). As, e.g., an economic institution is expected to 
work and contribute in relation to contemporary international economic order, 
political in political, but also in regards to their creation stemming to the source of 
its upcoming (ibid). Institutions may be a substitute to force through the strong 
participation of states, and quest towards common interests, not only their own, 
and may still be an establishing force of a hegemon based on the formations of 
those rules and norms, and the foundation of values related to the potential 
hegemon (Sterling-Folker, 2010, 120).  
Liberalist notions of international regimes have been affected by hegemonies 
(Little, 2008, 304-305). According to neoliberalists an international regime is 
defined as a high level of institutionalization, which may stem from hegemonic 
dominance in international systems (Little, 2008, 301). If a state has an 
overwhelming amount of power it has the possibility to uphold and impose 
international norms and institutions, creating effective outcome of public good on 
the international arena (Little, 2008, 301-305). These regimes stabilize the 
anarchical system, enhancing the incentives to cooperate and interdepend, by 
removing some of the fears of cheating, free-riding, etcetera. Neoliberalists 
furthermore claim that these regimes have proven very persistent and can survive 
and persist, even after the decline of the hegemon. Exemplification is made during 
earlier periods of hegemony where international interdependens and cooperation 
grew and broadened extensively as the hegemon secured the institutions in a 
system of anarchy, and the interdependence between states lead to a rationality to 
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continue cooperation (Sterling-Folker, 2010, 120-121). The institutions stemming 
from the hegemon, or a particularly powerful state, become normative platforms 
of cooperation between self-interested states. To neoliberalist accounts of 
hegemony the hegemon might therefore act as a kind of leader in the international 
system, influencing lesser powers thru consent and legitimacy by operating 
towards common goods (Grundig & Ward, 2008, 2-4)(Hurrell, 2006A, 550).  
Legitimacy may be gained through e.g. economic, political or religious aspects 
where other states have incentives to follow the hegemon in its actions (Grundig 
& Ward, 2008, 6)(Hurrell, 2006B, 3-4). Thereby the hegemon has the power to 
implement norms and institutions that gain the international or regional 
community through participation of other smaller states (Grundig & Ward, 2008, 
2-4). Though this system does not come for free, as the hegemon must be ready to 
carry some of the costs inclined with institutions for the good of all. By this 
relationship between the strong and the weak ideas can spread from the hegemony 
to weaker states based on legitimacy and economic strength of the hegemon 
(Hurrell, 2006B, 3-4). Dependent if the hegemon is regarded or portrayed as 
predatory or benevolent will greatly depend on the legitimacy of its hegemonic 
system, whereas e.g. in an economic system, the hegemony needs benevolent 
consensual legitimacy to lead weaker states to join and invest in the system of 
common goods (Brooks, 2012, 28). Security is often explained as a particularly 
common good in the international community, as is economic interdependence 
and human rights, etcetera, and through the flowing of ideas and politics in the 
globalization of neoliberalist relations, weaker states will follow the examples of 
the hegemon, democratizing which in turn leads to a more secure and stable 
system – based on the notion of democratic peace (Mearsheimer, 2001, 16-
17)(Warner & Zawahri, 2012, 226)(Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2008, 118).  
In relation to the neorealist predatory notion of hegemony, neoliberalist 
emphasize that the most powerful state should act in accordance with 
multilateralism, since multilateralism unlike unilateralism is based on norms, 
values and institutions instead of raw power (Brooks, 2012, 34). Military power 
and other “hard” powers exist and are noted, but not extremely important to the 
hegemon’s relations (Warner & Zawahri, 2012, 218-220). Since the emphasis is 
on consent and not coercion, military forces are mainly for the hegemon to gain 
legitimacy and ensure the safety of the institutions, and potential “rouge” states, 
and of course be a collateral factor in institutions of collective security (Warner & 
Zawahri, 2012, 218)(Grundig & Ward, 2008, 6).   
In regard to a hegemonic system, neoliberalists acknowledge the potential 
existence of a hegemon and its effects, as portrayed above, but do not necessarily 
see it as a precaution for a stable international system pointing to other 
explanatory factors as well (Milner, 1998, 115-116). Even though the relevance of 
the hegemon for creating and pursuing international institutions, though not for 
keeping them alive. 
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3.2.3 Answers to Cooperation – Neorealist version of Hegemonic 
Stability Theory and Hegemonic War 
The theory of hegemonic stability is widely debated but also adapted by different 
schools of thought (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004)(Grundig & Ward, 2008, 3)(Gowa, 
1989, 309). Both realist and liberalist scholars have applied their assumptions to 
hegemonic stability theory and acknowledges it in different ways. The source of 
the theory is also hard to grasp, since by some it is told to be a realist answer to 
international cooperation, or a liberalist explanation of a coercive hegemon 
(Grundig & Ward, 2008, 3). Proposed creators of hegemonic stability theory vary 
from Gilpin (1971, 1981) to Olsen (1965) to Kindleberger (1973) etcetera, and the 
resemblances of each of their proposals are evident – which hopefully will be 
shown in the following sections.  
The realist-prone version of theory of hegemonic stability is a theory much 
accredited to Robert Gilpin, in which he aims to explain international cooperation 
controverting neorealist assumptions (Gilpin, 1988)(Hall, 2006, 42). It is based on 
theories of economic history and brings a realist approach to how, why and what 
constitutes state cooperation, therefor being regarded as an answer to the 
neoliberalist approach and the fact that international cooperation has flourished 
since the end of the 20th century (ibid).  
Gilpin observes that liberal capitalist democracies have established deep-going 
and prolific international cooperation and trade, which he tries to explain in regard 
to unipolarity and hegemony (Hall, 2006, 42-43).  He draws special attention to 
the hegemon and explains that these institutions are unipolar in their existence and 
creation, despite if the world is bi- or multipolar, since they stem from the 
dominance of one powerful source (ibid). Order can be established in a system of 
anarchy by the dominative exercise of power by a hegemon (Keohane, 1986, 
198). Thus, Gilpin states that there is no necessary specific connection between 
political hegemony and economic liberalism (Gilpin, 1986, 311). He argue that 
other economical systems may also be associated with hegemonic dominance, 
much in relation to the hegemon and its perceptions and attitude. To exemplify he 
stipulates the importance for political hegemony and economic effectiveness for a 
nation to promote a liberal world economy (ibid).  
Some scholars even take it as far as arguing that a hegemonic state is 
necessary for the spreading of global common goods in the contemporary 
international system (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 3). The institutions in the 
international systems are enforced by the military power of the hegemon, in which 
the hegemon can use trade and norms to pursue its own goals, and the 
international system becomes more or less monopolized by the hegemon and its 
strength (Kohout, 2003, 54). The most fundamental role for the hegemon is to 
secure the international system with its military preponderance, and thereby 
passively encourage other states to cooperate (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 5). The 
hegemon will try to influence and change the system of interdependence towards 
its own advantage, using its supreme power (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 5). 
According to Thomas Pedersen major powers in the international arena may 
cooperate with other states if they see themselves having a certain relative 
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weakness, such as location, resources or prestige, in which they can gain 
advantage through cooperation, without others gaining as well (2002, 693). 
Another source of cooperation might be if the major power is in a military 
decline, or if the hegemon is essentially powerful in non-military areas, e.g. 
economics or culture, but weaker militarily (ibid.).  
Gilpin considers history as cyclical where war is a central concept as 
redistribution of power (Keohane, 1986, 177). The hegemonic war is defined as a 
war of determining dominance in the international system, where the victor take 
charge, defines the system and institutions, grows with the system and at last 
declines (Rosencrance, 1987, 284). Thence follows a period of growth, stability 
and prosperity, where institutions related to the hegemon are established and 
grow. So a hegemonic power has the ability to create order in anarchy through its 
dominance as periods of peace follow this establishment (Keohane, 1986, 189). 
Though, this expansion of power puts the hegemon in a more exposed position 
where it needs to continually spend more in order to safeguard and further expand, 
which gives other states opportunity to challenge the hegemon (Rosencrance, 
1987, 293).  
Theory of hegemonic stability is to be regarded as a view of when stability 
echoes the international system; the other side of the coin is the theory of 
hegemonic war (Kohout, 2003, 55). Due to the cyclical notion of the structure, 
Gilpin understands the system as transforming (Gilpin, 1988, 601-603). 
Hegemons are challenged by upcoming major powers, both economically and 
military, by the rivals gaining more and more power which most probably will 
lead to a central war of transition between major powers (Kohout, 2003, 55-58). 
According to Gilpin’s theory the challenger is most likely to initiate the 
confrontation – as offensive realism would suggest as well – in order to enhance 
its power and expand its influence (ibid.) But if not, there is also the risk of the 
hegemon initiating war in a preventing move to stop the rise of the challenger, in 
order to keep its momentum in the system.  
Gilpin builds his theory on basic realist assumptions, but his approach opens 
the possibility to, or at least attempts to, explain how institutions and rules can 
become inconsistent with the hegemon, leading to, and because of, its decline 
(Keohane, 1986, 177). This transformation is also an effect of the burden of costs 
within the system. Since the hegemon has the ability to, and do, take the heavier 
burden of the costs in the system, rationally based on the bigger gains, smaller 
states can enjoy the lower costs and in the long term have a stronger growth rate 
than the hegemon, leading to the inevitable economic and political descent of the 
hegemon (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 5).  
3.2.4 Liberalist Theory of Hegemonic Stability  
Liberalist scholars also inclined in defining and explaining the theory of 
hegemonic stability has a much more optimistic view of the world system. There 
are many similarities with the section of realist thinkers above, but also some 
essential differences. One of the main conceptual differences is regarding or 
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depicting the hegemon as benevolent or predatory (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 3). 
The more liberalist assumptions agree with its counterpart that the system is 
stabilized by one dominant hegemonic state that sets the rules for the system and 
is overly important to institutions and cooperation between states (Kukk, 2004, 1). 
The hegemon acts rational in that it gains the most of this cooperation and trade, 
and therefore accept the burden of extra cost (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 3). It uses 
the international norms and institutions to urge compliance from weaker states 
integrating them into the system (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 3). “International 
norms cannot come from any other source but a systemic hegemon” (Jungblut & 
Sacko, 2004, 3). Some scholars argue that economic trade, growth and 
cooperation are almost entirely dependent on whether international institutions 
are, and/or stem from, liberal democracies (Milner, 1998, 119).  
Liberalist adaptations of hegemonic stability theory also see the hegemonic 
system as cyclical but much more optimistically than Gilpin’s theory of 
hegemonic war. It is emphasized that due to the fact that the scale of the system 
and the amount of public goods will eventually drain the hegemon and its 
resources to the point where it is no longer “…a stable system care-taker.” 
(Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 4). Since the state with the most to gain from 
international cooperation will pick up the costs of that cooperation (Grundig & 
Ward, 2008, 3-4). The effects of driving global multinational institutions and 
cooperation, and protecting global stability and security, will eventually lead to an 
overinvestment in international ventures and national military, which as with 
Gilpin’s theories, will lead to the hegemons demise (McCormick, 1990, 129-130). 
Though contrary to the realist version this needs not to be followed by a central 
war. Liberal notions of hegemony as a fit between power, ideas and institutions 
challenge the realist idea of material and military raw power hegemonic 
dominance, showing that other factors related to the hegemon might help in 
explaining international stability under hegemonic rule (Cox, 1986, 224-225).   
A big difference between the two versions of the theory is the relation of 
means and tools in accordance to the assertiveness or aggressiveness of the 
hegemon. The more liberal stance would argue that the hegemon will more or less 
force weaker states into the system or regime by soft power measures making it 
e.g. economically or politically irrational not to, based on the distribution of 
public goods (Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 7-8)(Hurrell, 2006A, 556). The hegemon 
will employ economic and political coercive force to make a weaker state join the 
cooperation, motivated by its own legitimacy and possible dyadic gains for both 
the hegemon and the lesser power (Hurrell, 2006B, 7-8)(Hafner-Burton & 
Montgomery, 2008, 111)(Grundig & Ward, 2008). The more realist approach 
would instead deem this unnecessary since the military power of the hegemon will 
make states unwary knowing the risks of not cooperating (Destradi, 2010, 916-
918)(Jungblut & Sacko, 2004, 10-12). Since the rational state’s highest goal is its 
own survival, weaker states will voluntarily join in the cooperation both because 
of the hegemons hard power supremacy and due to the fact of other goals of the 
state (Grundig & Ward, 2008, 5-6).   
By emphasising the importance of other power factors than just military power 
liberal notions of hegemonic stability theory stipulates the importance of the 
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legitimacy behind the hegemons actions and behaviour – a leader needs followers 
– thus weaker states consenting to its hegemonic leadership (Warner & Zawahri, 
2012, 218).  
3.3 Southeast Asia and China 
Defining regional powers, Sandra Destradi stipulates the following assumptions as 
uncontested (2010, 905): That the state belong to the region, that they are the 
largest power in the region and that they influence the region of some kind. 
China is not historically considered to be part of Southeast Asia, which might 
be problematic in regard to this definition. In geographical terms China is a huge 
country and southern China borders Southeast Asian countries by both land and 
sea, and its most southern region – the island of Hainan – is located in the 
geographical region of Southeast Asia. The historical reef claims made by China 
in the South China Sea, are located in Southeast Asia, thus I understand China as 
regarding itself part of, or at least as a stake-holder in, the region (Hsiang, 
2008)(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 138). What typically defines a regional hegemon, 
according to Miriam Prys, is its geographical position within that region and its 
power supremacy in the region and neighbouring states – both materially and non-
materially (2010, 485).  
Identification to the region is an important factor since a hegemon, or major 
power, that do not identify itself in the region will most likely project inwardly 
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looking to national and global politics (Prys, 2010, 489). Much as China has done 
earlier following Deng’s strategies for national development.  
Another factor in relation to China’s vastness and in regards of it earlier 
possibly not regarding itself as part of the region, I believe, stem from the fact that 
modern history China’s domestic power centre is located in north east of China, 
mainly in Beijing, hence its focus, or priory, has been mainly towards the region 
of Northeast Asia. Though today with globalization and enhanced infrastructure 
that shortens the distances, central power holders in China are able to broaden its 
focus and views towards new core national interests (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 137-
141). Beijing overtook Nanjings role as capital in the 15th century during a large 
campaign against the Mongols in the north (Wang, 2012, 138). The official capital 
has changed many times since, but in 1949 Beijing was established as the present 
capital of China.  
The region of Southeast Asia does not have a particularly clear historical 
foundation, based on the fact of being under long colonial imperial rule, Japanese 
occupation and Chinese subordination (Best & Christiansen, 2008, 442).    
Particularly since the end of the cold war regional major powers have emerged 
as key actors on a regional arena assuming central roles in regional, and in some 
cases global, governance (Prys, 2010, 480). One difference from global hegemony 
is the overarching global system of which the regional hegemon must adapt to 
(Prys, 2010, 482). Regions as clusters of units or states have a structure in itself 
but must be embedded in a larger system, i.e. it cannot be the whole system 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 27). Hegemons may be inclined to include in the region 
in order to avoid other external powers, e.g. a global hegemon, from being the 
producer of public gains in the region (Hurrell, 2006B, 8). In a liberalist sense the 
regional hegemon therefore can stimulate an enhanced regional integration 
whereas national borders becomes less important and cooperation within the 
region more available (Best & Christiansen, 2008, 436-437).  
Regional powers might adapt their behaviour by external pressure from other 
more powerful states (Prys, 2010, 497). External powers can also effect the 
perception of the regional hegemon by e.g. influencing their values onto the lesser 
powers in the region or by an extension of military or economic resources 
reducing the importance of the hegemon (ibid.). Weaker states might willingly 
cooperate with the extra-regional power to resist the regional hegemons 
dominance (Prys, 2010, 497-499). Mearsheimer makes a distinction between 
global hegemony – domination of the world – and regional hegemony – 
domination of the geographical region – whereas a regional hegemon will try to 
prevent states in other regions acquiring the same status (Mearsheimer, 2001, 40-
43). If other regions consist of at least two major powers, their focus will be on 
each other.  
When studying a regional major power it is important to be aware of the 
dyadic split between regional and international levels (Prys, 2010, 498). Regional 
hegemons may have aspiration of becoming a global hegemon, which can infuse a 
split between global and regional interests and goals, and actions between the two.  
Depending on the relations between the region and the hegemon, neighbours 
may act alongside the hegemon or reject its hegemony resisting the hegemon 
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fearing its intentions (Prys, 2010, 493). Hurrell states that regional institutions and 
security cooperation may be an effect of the dilemmas of weaker states in relation 
the preponderant power (Hurrell, 2006A, 563-564) 
According to Mearsheimer gaining the status of global hegemony is barely 
feasible so states concentrate of becoming a regional hegemon (Mearsheimer, 
2001, 140-143). The biggest distinction between regions is vast distances of water 
between landmasses (ibid.). These waters make the first defensive line in security 
of the region, making it hard to launch global assaults from on region to another, 
unless the aggressor has established friendly relations in that very region in which 
it can disturb the stability in the hegemons backyard (Mearsheimer, 2001, 142-
143).  
3.4 Summary RAM and Hegemony 
Based on the observations of the different theories, regarding hegemony, what I 
regard the biggest differences between them is the dimension of consent and 
coerciveness stemming from the hegemon towards lesser powers AND the level 
of hard versus soft power for the hegemon to get its will. Meaning that depending 
on the theories above the hegemon is presumed to either engage its neighbours 
through getting their consent, by e.g. providing common goods, political or idea 
based leadership, or by coercing them, by e.g. military force, bribes or economic 
sanctions. The hegemon may pursue this by either soft power or hard power, 
depending on which theory in focus. To clarify further I regard the first section; 
offensive neorealism, as regarding the hegemon as getting its will through 
coercive hard power politics whilst the neoliberalist approach theorizes the 
hegemon as acting through consent and with soft power incentives (see figure 1.). 
To vividly examine and understand China by using the theories above I have 
decided to construct dimensions based on my theoretical findings.  
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3.5 Coercive – Consent Dimension  
In this first dimension I will add a historical parameter to vividly exemplify and 
explain Chinese behaviour in earlier periods of time related to today. Since China, 
which will be shown, is referring to an All-under-Heaven system as a form of 
Chinese political philosophy, that will be described, followed by an examination 
of an earlier period of Chinese hegemony, the Ming Dynasty, to compare 
contemporary All-under-Heaven with historical practice of All-under-Heaven, in 
3.5.1.  
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“Even though China should always speak with authority and strength, she 
needs to break the previously dominant political logic that any rising power will 
inevitably move toward hegemony. While China will never casually contemplate 
a war, neither will she ever retreat from any challenges when necessary. 
Therefore, China must also be careful that her own actions not be misinterpreted 
as adventurous and serving the wrong goals.” (Yu, 2013, 80). China is often 
trying to change its international image by portraying itself as benign, peaceful 
and stable stakeholder in international politics, for example; as the conception of 
the “China threat” was countered by the notion of the Chinese “peaceful rise”. 
Though, peaceful rise was changed later on to terms as “peaceful development”, 
“harmonious world” or “peaceful world” as “rise” made its neighbours anxious 
and concerned about the meaning of the rise (Breslin, 2009, 9-11). 
China insist that it is dedicated to a “peaceful rise” that will not affect and 
change the international system but instead will harmonize Southeast Asia under 
re-establishment of historic hierarchy that will threaten no one (Till, 2012, 21). 
Most understand the new Chinese assertiveness as starting after the beginning 
of the financial crisis in 2008, as they revised their grand strategy in seeing the 
start of the U.S. decline, leaving earlier strategy of Deng (Christensen, 2011, 1). 
Because of this assertiveness and arrogance China has managed to severely 
damage the relations with both its neighbours and the U.S., officially threatening 
neighbours, harassing foreign civil and military ships, shelling other states’ 
territories, violated neighbouring states’ territorial water, strengthening ties with 
U.S. adversaries e.g. North Korea and Iran, international cyber attacks and 
reconnaissance, etcetera, are among the deeds of China, which are used to 
exemplify this new assertiveness (Christensen, 2011, 1-3). “Looking at the current 
world situation, a full-scale war is unlikely, but we cannot exclude the possibility 
that, in some local areas, unexpected events may occur, or military friction may 
take place due to a misfire” – Liang Guanglie (See Till, 2012, 51). 
3.5.1 All-under-Heaven  
China is often and repeatedly stating the fact that they are not seeking or pursuing 
any form of hegemony, global or regionally (Breslin, 2009, 4). The “All-under-
Heaven” system stretches back over 3000 years and was a contributing factor to 
the unification of China under one rule (Tingyang, 2009, 7).  The main idea was 
to implement an overarching system to unify the world (China) through common 
political ideas and values, instead of force, establishing common goods and 
harmony through a universal system. It is including in its foundation and makes 
no differences among people and lands (Tingyang, 2009, 10). For the system to 
work it is necessary that all are included and inside the system, because it reduces 
the sense of disorder and anarchy in the international society. It is similar to 
realism meaning that an instable international system leads to disruption and high 
risks of conflict (Tingyang, 2009, 10). A universal and all-encompassing peace, 
universal harmony between all peoples, can only be achieved if all people are 
included in the All-under-Heaven system (Tingyang, 2009, 5).  
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The system is a triadic concept in a sense that it divides into three worlds – the 
physical, psychological and institutional (Yiwei, 2009, 110-112)(Tingyang, 2009, 
9). As physical and psychological implies including all people, and their ideas, the 
establishment of international institutions are of essential necessity (Tingyang, 
2009, 11). Making the “world” the highest entity in the system, All-under-Heaven 
emphasizes a one world-institution ensuring world order by establishing hierarchy 
on the international arena. Whereas the difference from western philosophy of 
nation-states, communities and individuals, is that in Chinese political philosophy 
see All-under-Heaven, nation-states, then families as the hierarchical order 
(Tingyang, 2009, 11). “The absence of a world institution as the highest political 
entity is dangerously incomplete in that there is no one to take care of the world.” 
(Ibid.). 
Chinese All-under-Heaven theory makes the world the primary object in the 
political order and the state is peripheral in contrast to western theory where the 
state is the primary (Tingyang, 2006, 31). A tightly connected concept is the Son-
of-Heaven who is entitled to rule in the All-under-Heaven system to improve the 
happiness and prosperity of all people (Tingyang, 2006, 32). This will not 
necessarily be a “dictator or a superpower, but one who has the right and power to 
justify the governance of All-under-Heaven.” (Ibid.).  
In Chinese political philosophy there is a great divide between rule and 
ownership (Tingyang, 2009, 6). Meaning that just because you rule the world does 
not necessary mean you own it. One power can govern and rule, without the love 
from the people and ownership of spirituality (Ibid.).  
 
From a historical perspective it is important to know that the Chinese rise is not 
something new, but in fact rather a re-rise to earlier greatness during history 
(Wang, 2012, 129). As during one of the earlier periods of Chinese greatness, the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644) China could dominate the region based on 
predominance in military power and superiority of economic resources (Wang, 
2012, 129-130). Thus giving them the capacity to expand their territory both on 
land and by sea. By their regional dominance China could, and did, influence the 
international system and controlled international politics on Chinese terms (Wang, 
2012, 130). It launched several campaigns aimed at crushing their Mongol 
adversaries in the north, and successfully annexed Vietnam, first making it a 
tributary state and later a Chinese province and part of Chinese territory, based on 
claims that Vietnam had belonged to China since ancient times (Wang, 2012, 137-
143). China also launched several maritime expeditions during this period, 
expanding its political influence into South East Asia and to India (Wang, 2012, 
143-144). Even though the aim was not to colonize or conquer the territories 
found, the might of the Chinese fleet showed China’s overwhelming power 
making it possible to conduct coercive diplomacy far from home. Many states 
were forced into submission making them tributary states submitting to the 
Chinese supremacy (Wang, 2012, 145). The tributary system infused hierarchy on 
international politics, making China the top of the system and setting the “rules of 
the game” by their hegemonic dominance (Wang, 2012, 147). The core of the 
system was based on harmony and coexistence through cultural expansion rather 
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than military might and conflict, making the Chinese emperor ruler of All-under-
Heaven, a concept that has returned to Chinese political philosophy (Wang, 2012, 
147-148). The Chinese culture was the aim for the system’s existence since the 
tributary states were allowed to trade with China, whilst those who refused where 
withheld this privilege, making it more or less impossible not to (Wang, 2012, 
148).  
 
Today, China, as a major economic power in the region have used its economic 
advantage against the states in Southeast Asia as a pressure tactic related to the 
maritime disputes and employed denial of market access (Graham, 2013, 309). A 
Philippine challenge of Chinese claims led to a boycott of banana imports in 2012 
making the Philippine’s drop their international proceedings in the UNCLOS 
(Ibid.). Many of the ASEAN states are seemingly suspicious towards the Chinese 
“peaceful development” claim and suspects the motives of Beijing as still 
expansionist and revisionist (Ho & Pitakdumrongkit, 2013). According to some, 
the All-under-Heaven theory gives China the belief that they have the mandate to 
rule their smaller neighbours and control their foreign policies just as they did 
under earlier periods of history (Dillon, 2011, 52). China will have the possibility 
to redraw the international economic order (Yu, 2013, 80). But, based on some 
essential assumptions by Chinese thinkers this may not take form as foreseen or 
understood by western scholars and power-holders. Chinese scholars and policies 
consequently reject interference in other states’ national affairs, based on the 
rejection of imperialism and feudalism and their own struggle during Mao’s rule 
(Ibid.). Combined with All-under-Heaven as a framework for economic 
development, prosperity and stability for all states lead Chinese scholars to 
emphasize a Chinese remaking of international order, and international non-
aggressive dominance, without necessary being a hegemon, since assumptions of 
hegemony would not fit, in China to “… cultivate peace and promote an equal, 
mutually respectful, pluralistic, and multipolar structure.” (Ibid.). 
 
ANALYSIS: According to Chinese officials and scholars, China is not 
pursuing a hegemonic system in Southeast Asia, but rather emphasize the All-
under-Heaven as a complement or substitute to the contemporary system and 
western philosophies. Relating to both history and narratives All-under-Heaven 
still shows to be rather coercive as states are forced to join the system by cultural, 
economic and military means. So, on the dimension of coercive-consent the All-
under-Heaven is regarded rather coercive based on contemporary assumptions 
and historical practice.  
3.5.2 The South China Sea and Taiwan 
“China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a 
fact.” – China’s former foreign minister Yang Jiechi argued at an ASEAN 
ministers conference in Hanoi 2010 after feeling attacked by former U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who argued to keep the freedom of navigation 
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in the South China Sea and stating it of national interest to the U.S. (Wasington 
Post, 2010).  
According to Dana Dillon, the South China Sea is the place where China is 
most likely to risk a military conflict (Dillon, 2011, 51). Today a Chinese military 
territorial expansion of the Paracel and Spratly isles in the South China Sea would 
most probably lead to war with the Philippines and Vietnam, and possibly more 
states claiming the reefs, shoals and islands (Fravel, 2010, 510-512). Trade and 
diplomacy would suffer deeply hurting the hastily growing economies and worsen 
China’s international image even more, consolidating the impression of China as a 
revisionist state (Ibid.).  
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, surrounded by China (and 
Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, consisting of 
hundreds of small reefs, islands, shoals, banks, etcetera, in form of four groups – 
the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel Islands and the Spratly 
Islands (Zou, 2012, 19). China is the only country that claim all the four groups, 
whereas the Pratas are under Taiwanese control, and China’s claim is under the 
unification of China, the Macclesfield Bank is claimed by China and Taiwan, the 
Paracels are under Chinese control but also claimed by Vietnam, and the Spratlys 
are claimed by all surrounding states except Indonesia (Zou, 2012, 19).  
The Chinese claims are based on the alleged discovery by Chinese fishermen 
and the historical usage of the islands (Thang & Thao, 2012, 36-37). Based on 
historical documents, i.e. maps, pre-dating the PRC, making it, in the eyes of the 
Chinese, rightfully theirs and all other’s claims false (Zou, 2012, 19-20). These 
maps and especially Atlas of Administrative Areas of the Republic of China, 
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published in 1948, support the Chinese claim by portraying a “traditional 
maritime boundary line” also called the e.g. “U-shaped line” or “Nine-dotted 
line”, which supposedly stipulate the Chinese maritime border (Ibid.). 
The South China Sea is rich on hydrocarbons and is one of the world’s busiest 
waterways with almost half of all the shipping in the world passing it (Dillon, 
2011, 54). Due to the competition between especially China and the U.S. in 
regards to oil and petroleum imports, China have been pursuing a form of neo-
mercantilist policies to become more self-sufficient and are mainly importing oil 
from states that are to be regarded as adversaries to the U.S. (Chanis, 2011, 286). 
China is well aware of its dependency in energy, and whilst the U.S. dependency 
in imported oil and gas is declining annually, China’s is growing in line with its 
development (Chanis, 2011, 287).  
Even though the benefits of controlling the Paracels and the Spratlys are 
uncertain, just as with Senkaku, the exclusive territory around are believed to 
contain vast amounts of natural resources that could lessen China’s dependency 
on imports (Fravel, 2010, 513-514). If the various groups of islands in the South 
China Sea were under Chinese sovereignty this would mean that China could 
claim large maritime zones adjacent to the islands as economic exclusive zones 
(Ibid.)(Fravel, 2011, 294).  
Another factor is the possibility to control the freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea, an extremely important trade route for China, the U.S. and 
internationally, which often has been stated by e.g. U.S. officials (Dillon, 2011, 
51). The Paracels and Spratlys located somewhat in the middle, with Vietnam to 
the west and Philippines to the east, China would gain an extreme tactical 
advantage both militarily, e.g. as buffer zone against the homeland, and with the 
possibility to control the trade route and to reduce the so called “Malacca 
dilemma” which is the fact that 85% of Chinese oil imports pass the Strait of 
Malacca and the SCS (Le Mière, 2013)(Fravel & Liebman, 2011, 62-63). Popular 
pressure and nationalism is another factor making the reefs a core interest for 
China (Fravel, 2010, 515-519). 
However, in 2002 China and the ASEAN states signed an agreement on the 
declaration of conduct in the South China Sea, acknowledging the different 
claimants and their disputes along with a promise to solve the disputes peacefully 
(Zou, 2012, 25). Though the disputes have not been solved but rather escalated 
since 2002, and especially after 2009, hence conflict have seemed quite imminent 
at many different occasions and growing number of reports of harassments by 
Chinese paramilitary law enforcement vessels, as e.g. Vietnam claim to have been 
harassed at 516 occasions last year – 223 more than in 2012 (Economist, 
2014)(Heydarian, 2014). 
The number of PLAN naval exercises in the South China Sea has increased 
under the last couple of years (Fravel, 2011, 308-309)(Green & Kliman, 2011, 
40). These exercises aim of both enhancing PLAN’s capabilities but also to 
demonstrate its enhanced power and ability to support Chinese claims of 
sovereignty (Ibid.). 
Except from PLAN activity in the South China Sea, China has also intensified 
the activity from coast guards and other maritime agencies to secure and monitor 
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their interests, by a larger fleet – from 113 vessels and 242 aircrafts in 2008 to 188 
vessels and 523 aircrafts in 2010 (Zou, 2012, 21). Examples of incidents often 
mentioned as fronting the new Chinese assertiveness are the interception of 
U.S.N.S Impeccable in 2009, the cutting of survey cables off Vietnamese and 
Philippine ships in 2011, and the confrontation with the Philippine warship in 
2012 (Le Mière, 2013). To further exemplify the situation in the SCS, Chinese 
ships attacked Vietnamese vessels by ramming and using water-cannons on the 7th 
of may this year, which according to international media risk escalating the 
situation, combined with oil-rig moves and new tension (cf. Son, 2014; Bateman 
2014)(Guardian, 2014). To reduce “foreign” fishing in the disputed waters China 
has approved new regulations for Chinese law enforcement vessels to board and 
search fishing vessels in claimed territorial sea (Bateman, 2012). The ADIZ in the 
East China Sea, established in November 2013, also worries the ASEAN 
members that China will deploy a similar zone in the South China Sea as Chinese 
defence ministry spokesman, a few days after the establishing of the ECS ADIZ, 
addressed the fact that China will deploy more identification zones at the right 
time (Loh, 2013).  
CCP still considers Taiwan as part of China and unification is a primary goal 
for Beijing, and China is officially prepared to take military action towards that 
goal if Taiwan choses to try to declare independence (Glaser, 2011, 4). Taiwan 
has postponed unification talks with China indefinitely, and even though the 
former president Hu officially stated that China would not use force against 
Taiwan, Taiping officials have officially shared its concerns about a Chinese 
military annexation (Bingham Kennedy, 2007, 286-269).  
 
ANALYSIS: Again China show a more coercive side related to their 
neighbours. Their core national interests are to be theirs at any cost. Even though 
the situation in the SCS has still not escalated into full-scale conflict, the actions 
of PLAN and other maritime agencies portray a very coercive strategy of 
harassment and non-conventional and non-confrontational assertiveness. China is 
forcing their neighbours to comply, but without risking war. With the situation 
with Taiwan I believe China to be biding their time, using coercive measurements 
and threats to keep Taiwan from declaring independence.  
3.5.3 Institutionalism and ASEAN 
The Sino-ASEAN relation has undergone a massive transformation during the last 
20 years and today China is one of the largest trade partners to ASEAN and has 
become an extremely important player in regional multilateral cooperation such as 
ARF, ASEAN plus three and East Asian Summit (Storey, 2012, 287). According 
to Ian Storey this development of deepening relations with ASEAN is for China to 
promote its peaceful development, building trust in the neighbourhood and for 
China to understand the interests and values of the ASEAN states (Storey, 2012, 
288). Also, China with its expansion in domestic military production know the 
value of trade in the developing and expanding region and military assistance can 
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help to undermine existing military relationships with external powers (Ibid.). The 
trade between China and ASEAN have increased immensely in the recent past, 
with an annual growth rate of 22%, the bilateral trade increased from US$BN 54 
in 2002 to US$BN 400 in 2012 (Ho & Pitakdumrongkit, 2013).  
Even though the charm-offensive towards ASEAN, the Chinese are still 
maintaining a non-negotiation policy towards their claims in the South China Sea, 
since China regards its sovereignty as indisputable (Shekar, 2012, 259). China is 
still arguing for bilateral discussions to solve the disputes and opposes any 
internationalization, but the ASEAN claimant states are declining, deeming it to 
be a simple attempt to “divide and conquer” (Storey, 2011, 15).  
But regardless of the fact that China is deeply suspicious of multilateralism 
with American presence, it has shown some willingness to involve itself in 
cooperative security and somewhat loosening earlier insistence of resolving 
international problems, disputes and situations bilaterally (Till, 2012, 223).  
Off course when talking about the relationship between ASEAN members and 
China I am aware that there are differences between the states (Shekhar, 2012, 
253). As the relationship with, for example, former communist states as Myanmar 
and Cambodia differs than for example the Philippines and Vietnam. 
China joining the WTO has greatly benefited its economic development 
(Gavin, 2013). Though recently a conflict between China and the WTO have 
arisen, due to the fact that China is not complying with the rules, embodied in 
GATT, it agreed to by joining. As the largest exporter of strategic raw materials, 
needed in high tech production, China has chosen to reduce the share of export 
motivated by domestic needs (Ibid.). This has led to a number of complaints, from 
e.g. the EU and the U.S., and a growing conflict between the WTO and China. 
And some other challenges against the U.S. international dominance have been 
made. As in 2009 the head of the People’s Bank of China called for the IMF to 
stop using dollar as the world reserve currency and find another alternative (Miller 
K., 2010, 1).  
 
ANALYSIS: The increased Chinese presence in regional institutions shows a 
more consenting side of China willing to accept and acknowledge regional 
institutions. Their presence shows an ambition to become a reliable stakeholder in 
the region and to help development and security in the region. To make smaller 
states comply with China by consent and to challenge the U.S. pivot taking away 
their friends. China as a potential hegemon may have the power to redraw the 
international system, based on theoretical assumptions earlier in this chapter, and 
the conflicts with international institutions may be a sign that China is not content 
with some liberal capitalist institutions stemming from the U.S. and Britain.  
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3.6 Hard – Soft Power Dimension 
3.6.1 The PLA and Sub-divisions 
Beijing has been upgrading their military capacity for the last 15 years (Bitzinger, 
2011, 7). Richard Bitzinger suggest five reasons for this as he argues that (1) 
China want to accompany their cultural, diplomatic and economic “soft power” 
with “hard power” military resources as (2) they seem more prone to use military 
means towards their key regional interests and (3) to deter Taiwan from declaring 
independence with the goal to incorporate them in the motherland (Ibid.). (4) And 
to broaden their capacity of operations to be able to secure and promote growing 
interests abroad and become more active in international activities, and lastly (5) 
to restrict and mitigate U.S. power in the region by becoming stronger.  
Today the Chinese military budget is more than three times as high as the 
ASEAN countries together (Yahuda, 2013, 452). According to Japan’s MoD, 
China is doubling its defence expenditure every five years and has become the 
second largest defence spender in the world, spending around 90 US$BN a year 
(2011), which would imply that China would reach contemporary U.S. level in 
about 15 years from 2011 (Till, 2012, 49, 249 fig. 1.). The remarkable increase in 
military spending started 1997, and was the start for what is called double-digit 
real annual growth, which is still growing in size (Bitzinger, 2011, 7). In real 
terms, the Chinese defence budget has increase with over 600% since 1997, and in 
recent years from 2008 until 2011 it grew from US$BN 61,2 to US$BN 91,51 
(Bitzinger, 2011, 8). AND, most military experts claim the official numbers in the 
Chinese defence budget to be greatly underestimated and undervalued, and real 
figures may be from 1.5 to ten times higher than the official budget (Bitzinger, 
2011, 9). The PLA, PLAN, PLAAF and PLANAF have been extremely 
modernized and have enhanced capability both qualitatively and quantitatively 
and now possess e.g. stealth-, standoff precision-, long-range airborne-, undersea 
attack- and expeditionary warfare- capabilities (Bitzinger, 2011, 10). Due to 
procurements and Chinese defence industry and industry-theft it is still 
developing, as for example there is speculation that China is looking into buying 
around 50 fixed-wing fighter jets, e.g. Russian Su-33, producing six new aircraft 
carriers, manufacturing its first homemade fourth-generation-plus combat aircraft 
J-10, long-range precision-strike ballistic missile-systems, developing a high tech 
C4ISR system, etcetera (Bitzinger, 2011, 9-13). The CMC have been working 
actively to increase the ability for joint operations within the PLA (Miller A., 
2014, 9).  
China is regularly declaring that defence procurements or military exercises 
are not aimed at other countries (Till, 2012, 37). Even though China is upgrading 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 2008 US$BN 61,2. 2009 US$BN 70,3, 2010 US$BN 81. 2011 US$BN 91,5. 
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and developing its military strength, Chinese leaders claim that the force is merely 
defensive (Mearsheimer, 2010A, 383-386).  
China’s military defence strategy is related to their military development as 
the PLA is officially intended to be a defensive force and only attack when 
attacked, but with a forward-defence posture (Bitzinger, 2011, 8). This lead to 
building a force capable of fighting and winning short-duration high-intensive 
conflict, based on speed, agility and long-ranged attacks and five-dimensional 
warfare (Ibid.). 
China’s naval capacity is growing at a fast pace with the first aircraft carrier 
Liaoning, growing submarine fleet and growing surface fleet (Till, 2012, 36). 
They have strengthened the capacity of the southern fleet and actively enhance the 
activity of the Yulin naval submarine base on the southern tip of Hainan (Till, 
2012, 42).  
 
ANALYSIS: Looking at the development of military means China is definitely 
enhancing their hard power means. As their annually accumulated double-digit 
military development spending probably will not slow down in the near future, 
China will have the opportunity to challenge the U.S. and dominate the region. 
Even though Chinese officials argue the defensive objective of their military, 
defensive means can easily be used for offensive purposes.  
3.6.2 Foreign Aid and Projects  
At the 17th party congress in 2007 CCP officially launched their new strategy of 
soft power, spreading Chinese culture to serve strategic interest (Courmont, 2013, 
343). Initially the Chinese soft power strategy has two different ambitions; to 
enhance the rise of China, which they emphasize does not depend purely on hard, 
AND; to establish a favourable international environment to rise in, based on 
cooperation, mutual benefit and friendship regionally, which hard power could not 
do without being to costly (Courmont, 2013, 349). Today Chinese soft power is 
primarily aimed at improving the international picture of China and its rise, by 
investing huge amounts in hosting different sport and cultural events, investing in 
developing countries, seducing the world and showing the good side of China 
(Courmont, 2013, 350-352). Even though the Chinese strategy is considered to be 
global, Southeast Asia has been the main target for several years (Ibid.). The soft 
power strategy of Beijing raises concern internationally of it being the start of 
Chinese hegemonic ambitions (Courmont, 2013, 357). The U.S. and its liberal 
allies see an authoritarian government with exceptional economical development, 
a combination that most certainly would seem attractive and favourable to 
democracy for potential leaders in developing countries (Ibid.).  
The Chinese charm-offensive was to show regional countries that their 
economic boom, i.e. peaceful development, would lead to prosperity in the whole 
region and that China is a benign power and not a threat, drawing on consensus 
and economic development through institutional globalization and not through 
regional military expansion and hegemony (Storey, 2012, 293).  
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China is trying to portray itself as a benign neighbour by using soft power 
measures, as aid, diplomacy and trade, to get a better national image (Lum et al., 
2008, 1). They are affecting the behaviour of their neighbours by mainly using 
economic soft power tools, but also by spreading a sense of an Asian community 
and Asian values to create resemblances between peoples (Lum et al., 2008, 2). In 
economic terms China is still maintaining its non-interference policy in other’s 
national affairs, so instead of direct aid with counterclaims, China is assisting in 
giving loans, to e.g. infrastructural projects and energy projects, and then have 
Chinese companies completing the projects (Lum et al., 2008, 5). This approach is 
very appreciated in the receiving country, but has brought international criticism 
that China is not promoting values of human rights and democracy. Examples of 
projects include ports in Myanmar and Bangladesh, railroads in ASEAN countries 
and Nepal, sport stadiums and infrastructure in Latin America and Africa (Horta, 
2014)(Miller K., 2010, 5).  
Related to Chinese soft power Beijing officials have often portrayed China 
with “great power style” which is closely related to a “responsible great power”, 
similar to, according to Chinese scholars, a benign hegemon (Yang, 2011, 63-65). 
This concept has roots in historic culture and philosophy, especially 
Confucianism, and is to support the notion of peaceful rise and not a China threat 
(Yang, 2011, 65-68). Li Mingjiang argues that the single most important soft 
power for China is its “traditional culture”, mostly as its notions of a peaceful rise 
and harmonious world order stem from its cultural heritage and combined 
philosophy of earlier Chinese thinkers (see Breslin, 2009, 12). Though 
“historically, a strong China has brutalized the weak”, based on the same cultural 
heritage soft power as China is promoting today (See Cohen in Breslin, 2009, 13). 
Confucius institutes, financed by the CCP, are now widespread around the globe 
in over 50 different countries offering promotion in the Chinese language, 
education, culture, and cultural exchange (Cheng J., 2013, 59-60).  
 
ANALYSIS: The Chinese soft power has also developed extensively. Showing 
that China want to pursue a peaceful stability in the region and internationally. 
The aid packages are meant to make states more positive and reliant of China and 
their development. As the Chinese charm-offensive is to be improve the 
neighbours’ image of China understanding that China will be a friend and not 
foe.  
3.7 ASEAN Reaction  
Something very similar to an arms race is currently underway in Southeast Asia as 
arms procurements and military budgets has increased and are still increasing. For 
example many countries have acquired high technology jet fighters, submarines, 
air-to-air and air-to-ground weapon systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, C4ISR 
systems and put large orders on different forms of armoured vehicles and battle 
tanks (Bitzinger, 2010, 51-52). According to Richard Bitzinger there are of course 
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several reasons for this armament in the region, but he declares ASEAN nations 
arming themselves against China as probably the most important (Bitzinger, 2010, 
61). In 2011 Asia surpassed Europe for the first time in net defensive spending 
according to IISS (Till, 2012, 31-33). Patterns of defence expenditure in Asia is 
highly connected to Chinese procurement and behaviour and, according to 
Geoffrey Till, the defence expenditure of China’s neighbours and rivals is much 
correlated to the ambiguity regarding the Chinese rise, its new assertiveness and 
the haste of China’s defence-spending growth (Till, 2012, 32).  
Asia and Southeast Asia today is bipolar in the U.S. pivot and China, no other 
local state has the capacity to challenge China without the support of the U.S. 
(Godwin, 2004, 83). The ASEAN response to the rise of China is two-folded both 
hedging, building stronger ties with the U.S. and other ASEAN member states, 
procuring arms and expanding the military, whilst still trying to better the 
relationship with China to gain economically and financially from its rise (Shekar, 
2012, 260-263)(Graham, 2013). As with Singapore for example, often 
humorously called the USS Singapore based on the huge U.S. military presence, 
while simultaneously pragmatically strengthening ties with China (Graham, 2013, 
312). The Philippines have again opened up their bases to U.S. forces after closing 
them in 1992 and the U.S. answered by tripling their military assistance (Graham, 
2013, 313). But the lack of trust within ASEAN makes most of the ASEAN 
members to hedge against both each other and China by military rearmament and 
bandwagoning with the U.S. (Hao & Tsung-Yen, 2013)(Chang, 2013, 58).  
In January 2013 the Philippines officially lodged a legal claim to the UN to 
examine the matter with an arbitrary tribunal under UNCLOS (Thayer, 2013, 80). 
China dismissed the Philippine claim and started to diplomatically pressure other 
ASEAN members to lobby the Philippines to drop their claim.  
 
ANALYSIS: I believe the reaction of the states in Southeast Asia to be 
explaining the situation quite well. As regarding the theories earlier, the smaller 
states are reacting exactly as the more realist versions said they would, by hedging 
and bandwagoning. The extreme rearmament in the region, the closer ties with the 
U.S. and some trying to better the relations with China show that at least the 
neighbours portray China as a hegemon or potential hegemon in the region.  
3.8 Analysis 
To summarize the shorter paragraphs of analysis above I believe that it is hard to 
conclude that the newfound assertiveness is based on a pursuit of regional 
hegemony, at least in classical terms. The dimension of soft versus hard power 
showed to be quite bland since both areas have undergone heavy development and 
investment. But, on the coercive consent dimension China show a particularly 
coercive posture toward the region. Sure, some signs of consensual behaviour are 
there but get overshadowed by the more aggressive coerciveness.  
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So, to further relate to the international theories used, where do we place 
China? And can we assume that China is pursuing hegemony whilst still arguing 
not to? My belief is simply no, not based on these theories. I believe the answer is 
to be found within the All-under-Heaven philosophy, and the historical practice. 
Looking at earlier Chinese All-under-Heaven I believe that we can see distinct 
similarities with Chinese behaviour and development. Develop the military to be 
able to coerce others to compliance through overwhelming power. Use soft power 
to coerce states to follow the system and comply with Chinese rules. Set the rules 
of the game, subjugate, but not conquer. Well is that not hegemony? Perhaps, but 
not according to the Chinese, since it challenges some essential assumptions of 
western conception of hegemony. First, it does not stem from a liberal democracy 
and has a different set of rules and values – making liberalist assumptions 
unimportant. Second, the difference in the entities of All-under-Heaven and 
western philosophy is essential. The nation-state is not the highest entity – the 
world is and the world is not a hegemon. And lastly, it does not fit realist 
assumptions since the system would be hierarchical and not anarchical.  
 
 
 
 
  36 
4 Foreign Policy and Hegemony 
As noted in the previous chapter, theories of international politics attempts to 
understand and explain state behaviour based on assumptions about the 
international system, whilst theories of foreign policy-making instead focuses on 
the actions of each individual unit in the same system (Gustavsson, 2006, 255-
256). Since states seldom act as anticipated, as IR theories would understand 
them, we need to emphasise understanding of the unit level as well to understand 
why states would pursue hegemony (Ibid.). This inside-out perspective of the 
same phenomenon hopefully grants the possibility to study how foreign policy is 
conceived, actualized, changed, etcetera.  
4.1.1 The Decision-Unit 
When studying the production of foreign policy, states are still the central unit, 
since foreign policy constitutes the state’s policies towards the international 
community (Gustavsson, 2006, 256). But instead of just accepting the state’s 
actions as related to the system, the focus is on the choices made by individuals, 
groups or coalitions inside the units that affect the state’s international behaviour 
(ibid.)(DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 3). While an analysis of the system may be 
productive, no big international event is understandable without an additional 
analysis of the decision-making of those in power (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, 
511). Thereby trying to identify patterns or forces driving the decision-unit in a 
state towards a certain policy or decision (DeRouen  & Mintz, 2010, 5, 18). 
Therefore it is an important step when analysing foreign policy to understand and 
identify who is in charge of the decisions in a state. The decision-unit can take 
different formations depending on factors within the state either being an 
individual, group or coalition (Ibid.).  
The individual level regards the importance of the one actor in charge and how 
different actors or leaders differ the foreign policy (Gustavsson, 2006, 268). The 
individual as a decision-unit often stem from an individual with almost autocratic 
power in which institutional constrains and consensus is rather unimportant 
(DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 19).  
The small group as a decision-unit instead consists of a small amount of like-
minded actors with allegiance to the group (Ibid.). The group takes the decisions 
regarding foreign policy and can consult actors outside the group.  
Coalitions instead imply decision-making by a group of actors with allegiance 
to other outside the group (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 20-21). Decisions cannot be 
taken unilaterally but rather by reaching consensus or compromises between the 
coalition members.  
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Decisions made by the decision-unit might also be affected by external factors 
(DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 25-30). These factors may lead the decision-maker to 
make a decision based on a more or less holistic or heuristic search, where a 
holistic search implies a full examination of alternatives and implications, and 
heuristic employs cognitive shortcuts (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 17). Some factors 
are often more related to a certain decision-unit, e.g. as when studying decisions 
made by a dominant individual psychological factors are often in focus (DeRouen 
& Mintz, 2010, 18-20).  
 
Figure 2.  
4.1.2 Model II - Organizational Behaviour 
The second model presented in Allison’s Essence of Decision is called 
Organizational Behaviour. He begins by clarifying one of the key factors in this 
model, that a state does not consists only of one governing entity, but instead of 
amounts of organizations, governed by different rules, norms and standards, and 
responsible for different areas (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 143). States handle 
situations based on how national organizations work and depending on the 
capabilities they possess (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 6-7). As far as possible, 
organizations avoid acting on estimates of an uncertain future, and new solutions 
used are considered rare, as they rather adapt existing solutions to meet new 
emerging problems (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 152). Because of this, 
organizations are rationally limited when considering the solution with the highest 
utility declined due to limited capacity of the organization (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, 156). In Model II, Allison emphasize that international relations are 
governed by the results of organizational processes at the national level, and 
national organizations’ capacity (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 164). 
Thus organizations can act both as actors and as formal or informal, 
collections of actors (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 145). Within organizations 
operators act to control the organization’s objectives and constitute, together with 
material and technological conditions, its capacity (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 143-
147). Prior to decision-making processes within the state, each organization act as 
an actor, in the great organization that is the state, and wants to pursue their goals 
and demonstrate its capacity towards a national decision that goes on par with the 
organization (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 149). 
Hence an analysis of international relations, according to Allison, consists of 
questions such as: which organizations constitute the helm of state? What 
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capabilities and capacities do they possess? What limitations and opportunities 
exist for organizational performance (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 390)?  
4.1.3 Model III - Governmental Politics   
Allison’s third and final model takes a similar path as the model II, which critics 
of Allison also point out (Bendor & Hammond, 1992). The state is not a single 
actor but consist of groups or games, which in turn consist of many players 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 255-258). Each player is an actor whose actions in the 
national arena affect state behaviour on the international arena (Ibid.). Since 
players do not act according to a national target or a national strategy, or against 
the same international problems, decisions are made not pursuing a particular 
rational decision, but rather  “by the pulling and hauling that is politics” (Allison 
& Zelikow, 1999, 255). 
The players try to influence decisions accordingly to what they consider to be 
the essentials of a certain situation - in which the nation’s actions really matter - 
however players are considered responsible citizen that pursue what they believe 
to be the most favourable for the state (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 256). The state, 
or the state’s actions, is not considered rationally stipulated, despite the fact that 
an individual can be rational, the bureaucracy and politics of a group or coalition 
result in that no single player will be able to push through its favourable action 
altogether, but the end result will consist of a compromise of several players’ 
opinions, which thereby will not be the most rational decision possible (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, 271-273, 294-295). Therefore, the actions of states are not 
specifically selected to solve a specific problem, but rather a result of a political 
game between national players. The players’ ability to influence the state’s action 
consists of several different variables, such as the player’s power and influence, 
the way the game is structured, what perceptions that drive each player. So, the 
core ingredient to Allison’s third model for studying the actions of states, or why 
states have changed their behaviour in international relations, is to identify the 
game and the players in the national arena and highlight its capabilities and 
inluence to manage their positions, compromise and bargaining (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, 257).  
4.1.4 Model II & III and Hegemony 
Gustafsson argue that the forces of foreign policy are easier identified if we first 
understand and identify the goal of certain behaviour (Gustavsson, 2006, 259). 
Assuming hegemony, in regards to the previous chapter, as a state with the ability 
to dominate others, disregarding sources of power and means of force, hegemonic 
pursuit is to be considered as a sequence of decisions based on normative foreign 
policy trying to become the dominant state. Decisions made in regard to foreign 
policy are to be understood as measures or means towards the goal of hegemony. 
Hence decisions are sought to deal with problems, in the sense that the problem is 
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the difference between the present and the goal (Herrman M., 2001, 51). In 
relation to organizational behaviour and governmental politics, the explanation is 
to be found amongst the top-level characters of the state (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, 143, 255, 296).  
Organizational behaviour would explain the pursuit in the capacity and 
procedures of the organizations available to the decision-unit (DeRouen & Mintz, 
2010, 170)(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 6). Thus assuming that the state has the 
necessary organizations, with enough capacity to pursue that goal, or rather the 
decisions made towards that goal, thereby analysing the output from those 
organizations (Mintz & Redd, 2013, 21-22). Organizations will try to maximize 
their own importance and capacity in order to be a vital part in the decision-
making whilst still maintaining its autonomy (Mintz & Redd, 2013, 23-24). The 
semi-rationality of the model falls under the fact that a most rational decision or 
behaviour of a state might be limited due to the capacity of the organizations 
(Mintz & Redd, 2013, 22)(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 271).  
The governmental politics model would instead show explanations of the 
pulling and pushing of politics (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 170)(Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, 6-7). Assuming that decision-making is based on the bureaucratic 
negotiations of the players, a pursuit of hegemony would instead be found within 
the perceptions and argumentation of the players (Mintz & Redd, 2013, 22-23). 
Governmental politics model assume that bureaucracies are jealous in the sense 
that they want to protect their own area of expertise with the ambition to grow in 
importance (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 71-71). This might lead to rivalry between 
the different organizations or agencies since foreign policy often cross between 
different areas (Ibid.).  
This model is not likely to play out well during crises with high time pressure, 
but rather efficient analysing long-term policies (Ibid.). The organizational 
behaviour model also fits a long-term policy field since decision or policy-making 
in situations without time-pressure gives way to a more extensive information 
search that makes it possible to chose or adapt the best standard operating 
procedure (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 73). 
4.1.5 Factors Affecting Decisions 
“The real world is complicated” and one of the essential assets of analysing 
foreign policy in comparison to international politics is the possibility to 
acknowledge and adapt factors outside the assumed rational mind of the decision-
maker(-s) that might affect the decision taken (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 97). E.g. 
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psychological factors that might affect a leader to strive for hegemony even 
though it would not be a rational decision, or to use means or measures that is not 
the naturally best decision. National actors are not necessarily irrational, but these 
factors might lessen the ability for the actor to be perfectly rational in its decisions 
(Ibid.). Decision-units most often consist of small groups or strong individuals as 
psychological factors might have great affect on both the explicit decision, and the 
Standard Operating Procedures and the bureaucratic games (Ibid.). These factors 
make an especially interesting case when trying to understand state behaviour in a 
given set (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 104). If decisions vary but the most common 
points of analysis – resources, alliances and regime type – do not, psychological 
factors, may have explanatory power to that certain behaviour.  
Emotions affect the decision-unit through the acts of others in the sense that it 
differs from mood or feelings (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 99-100). Other states’ 
actions against the nation may affect and emotionalize the populous that in turn 
spread to the leader making his decision based on those emotions.  
A leader’s beliefs of itself and others also affect the decisions made in foreign 
policy (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 101-103). It may change how the decision-unit 
processes the information at hand, but also the view of the outcomes of certain 
behaviour. A leader’s or group’s personality and leadership style also affect the 
decision-making (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 114-119). Difference in leadership 
personality may lead to a different set of priori and ideas, which may help us 
understand why leaders in similar situation make different decisions. E.g. 
nationalism, distrust, problem solving, power seeking, and etcetera may be traits 
of leaders personalities affecting how they act in foreign policy. Leadership style 
helps us understand why a certain course of action is chosen looking to what 
might drive the leader (Ibid.)(Renshon & Renshon, 2008, 511-512). Their 
reactions to political constrains and new information and how they are pursuing 
their version of the world (Herrman M., 2001, 66).  
Except from psychological factors affecting the process of foreign policy-
making there are of course other factors outside the mind of the decision-unit that 
affect the decision in a certain situation (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 121). Several 
different factors, both domestic and international, affect a state’s foreign policy 
behaviour (Herrman & Herrman, 1989, 362). As DeRouen & Mintz state “Foreign 
policy decisions are typically made in a strategic setting” (2010, 121). This 
strategic setting is disturbed by other states actions and behaviour at which the 
decisions must be directed. Factors such as an arms race, deterrence, adversary 
regime type, alliances, and surprises change the strategic setting and extendedly 
the decision-making (Ibid.). These external or international factors lead to an 
action-reaction sequence of foreign policy as one state act in relation to the 
current setting or other states behaviour leading to a reaction from adversaries and 
so on (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 121-129).  
Along with international factors that affect decision-unit behaviour are 
domestic factors (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 129). Economic conditions, public 
opinion and national politics all are important factors that may drive the decision-
unit toward a certain decision or behaviour, as the decision-unit must take these 
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factors into consideration when making a certain decision in foreign policy 
(DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 129-134).  
There are several tactics at hand for the decision-unit to try to e.g. garner 
public support for a certain action or reaction on the international arena (DeRouen 
& Mintz, 2010, 149). By marketing a certain decision both at home and abroad 
the leader can minimize or perhaps eradicate an otherwise opposing or resisting 
factor to that decision (Ibid.). By framing a given behaviour in one way or another 
will affect how the public, adversaries, allies, etcetera, precepts that behaviour 
(DeRouen & Mintz, 2010, 150-151). Economic, military and diplomatic means 
also belong in the set of tools for states to use internationally to achieve a certain 
goal directly affecting other states (Gustavsson, 2006, 261).  
4.1.6 Change 
A fundamental quality and need for foreign policy is the ability to change in times 
of need (Herrman C., 1990, 3-5). Changes in a country’s foreign policies or 
strategies might lead to profound changes and have enormous effects on the 
international arena and are of big interest (Ibid.). As Charles Herrman state; 
redirections in a country’s foreign policy can lead to that “Wars may begin or end. 
Economic well-being may significantly improve or decline. Alliances may be 
reconfigured. Sometimes the entire international system is affected, as when the 
Cold War began after 1945.” (1990, 4). Major redirections in foreign policy might 
come out of three different settings in a country; changes in the means, in the ends 
or in the overall orientation (Herrman C., 1990, 6). One way of understanding 
these changes are through the lenses of understanding the bureaucracy of politics 
and organizations (Herrman C., 1990, 8, 11). Since the organizations in general 
are, as Allison also point out, resisting change in favour of standard operating 
procedures new capacities of the organization or new perceptions of important 
players can lead to big changes in foreign policy (Ibid.).    
4.2 Summary Foreign Policy and Model II & III 
To summarize the sections above a foreign policy decision is taken either by an 
individual, a small like-minded group or a coalition. Many different factors affect 
how that decision is conceived and made. Hence to continue this study we need to 
initially examine who is in charge in Chinese foreign policy-making. These results 
will effectively reduce the number of potential factors effecting foreign policy. 
Step two is to try to highlight these factors and their effects, looking at different 
organizations capacity and political games that affect.  
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4.3 Chinese Foreign Policy 
Today the Deng-ists are loosing ground in Chinese politics as the CCP has bigger 
struggle to manage the complexity of the Chinese society (Green & Kliman, 2011, 
36). One reason for Beijing stepping away from Deng’s strategies, according to 
Breslin, was that Chinese thinkers based on realist assumptions motivated 
engagement as the best solution to counter and reduce U.S. regional influence, 
thereby an engaging policy being the best strategy for Chinese security and 
national economic interests (Breslin, 2009, 7). The CCP is painfully aware of the 
rising social and political challenge with the growing inequality and social 
protests in China (Lagerkvist, 2014). Alongside the rapid modernization and 
globalization, digital communication is now more available to the Chinese 
population. The ability to monitor and follow the CCP and their decisions have 
made the CCP more vulnerable (Ibid.) Their awareness of this fact lead to a 
response of a tighter grip on digital communication, banning several international 
websites and TV-shows and higher level of censorship, alongside a stronger 
ductility toward popular opinion and flows in society (Green & Kliman, 2011, 
40). The more operational independence of the PLA is also more and more 
International Factors
Problem
National Factors
New Organizations want to be used by the decision-unit.
New Capacities of the organizations offer new options to the decision-
unit.
Games between players inﬂuence decision-making leading to compro-
mises. 
Players get more inﬂuencial affecting the decisions towards their opinion. 
Players both inside and outside the decision-unit try to inﬂuence decisions 
by bureaucratic politics. 
The Outcome is the decision which aims to be the solution to 
a problem.
The Decision Unit
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS
Psycological Factors
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established as it approaches domains of space, cyberspace and further evolves into 
the maritime sphere (Green & Kliman, 2011, 36). 
Others rejecting the new international assertiveness systemic assumptions 
motivate the policy change in national factors affecting the decision-unit and their 
struggle to keep the power nationally (Breslin, 2009, 7). Paranoia and insecurity 
stemming from historical cases of other communist parties in the western liberal 
capitalist world lead to a policy to minimize problems and obstacles 
internationally to be able to focus on stability at home and the survival of the 
party (Breslin, 2009, 8). Chinas neo-authoritarian rule defines by economic 
reforms and adapting to international economic market and institutions, whilst 
still holding a strong grip around politics and the population (Lagerkvist, 2014).  
4.3.1 The Politburo & the Fifth Generation   
Several Chinese thinkers are stating that China is almost totally revived to its 
historic grand statute, and that the new leadership must continue and adept the 
progress started by Mao (Yu, 2013, 76). Mao who, by military force and struggle, 
brought China out of humiliating feudalism and imperial oppression, followed by 
the development policies for economic prosperity and market economic reforms 
by Deng and Jiang, further developed under Hu, the rise of China will possibly 
reach the grandeur status of history under the rule of Xi (Ibid.). Deng’s reforms of 
opening up China to the world ended the self imposed Maoist isolation of China 
(Godwin, 2004, 81). Under Xi’s term as president China will most likely surpass 
the U.S. as the largest economy in the world and reduce the gap to the U.S. 
military and actually become a potential challenge (Yu, 2013, 80).  
The politburo has historically consisted of around 20-25 members and the 
smaller standing committee, which is the CCP’s decision-making organ in major 
policies, consist of 5-9 members (Miller A., 2011, 2-5).  
In recent years a notion of inner-party democracy has been established to 
eradicate the earlier zero-sum game where the winner takes it all of Chinese 
politics (Cheng, 2008, 77). Due to this decentralization of the foreign decision-
making process the central committee has started to consult different ministries 
and organizations before making the process, more influenced by other actors 
(Jianwei & Xiaojie, 2014, 222). The members of the 18th politburo stem from two 
different coalitions within the party, called the elitists and the populists, or 
princelings - as offspring of earlier CCP leaders versus up-comers from the CCYL 
(Cheng, 2008, 77-78)(Chen & Zheng, 2009, 25). The president of China and first 
ranked member of the politburo Xi is affiliated with the factional group of the 
elitists, while the premier of China Li Keqiang, second ranked in the politburo, 
and Li Yuanchao vice president – protégés of earlier president Hu – are 
considered members of the populist faction. The two top characters, Xi and Li are 
considered to be very different in their political views, as the former is considered 
quite liberal in regards to economic globalization whilst conservative regarding 
political democracy (Cheng, 2008, 89-90). Li on the other hand is just the 
opposite. “China’s decision-makers are by no means a monolithic group of elites 
  44 
who share the same views, values, and visions; nor are they always engaged in a 
ferocious zero-sum struggle for power in which the winner takes all.” (Cheng, 
2008, 54).  
Within the Confucian family the father controls and has authority over all 
family members (Lu et al., 2012, 234). A form of paternalistic leadership is 
frequent within Chinese organizations in which the leader is to take the approach 
of the father as a severe and teaching authoritarian whilst still promoting harmony 
and helping the organization (Ibid.). Successful collectivism within an 
organization is that subordinates understand the hierarchy of the organization and 
accepts the legitimacy of the leader to make the group more effective than any 
individual. 
All former Chinese top leaders have understood and acknowledge the 
importance of unity on the top level of the communist party (Cheng, 2008, 55). 
Though scholars predict that the “fifth generation” of Chinese decision-makers 
will have a troublesome time to establish unity within the politburo based on three 
assumptions; that China is moving away from the unitary form of autocratic 
leadership towards a more collective process of decision-making within the top 
level of the Chinese communist party; the diverse backgrounds of the ruling elite 
of the fifth generation; and the new challenges of economic disparity, social 
unrest and pollution  (Cheng, 2008, 55). Since Mao, who had an unlimited amount 
of autocratic power, each of his predecessors have had to accept less and less 
unilateral power, the former president Hu Jintao had to relate to collective 
decision-making rather then strong-man politics (Chen & Zheng, 2009, 8-9).  As 
the Chinese decision-unit is moving away from the strongman toward more 
collective decision-making the Chinese top leader constrained by public opinion, 
norms, etcetera making them more forced to consult rather than decide (Lampton, 
2014, 76).  
President Xi was elected at the 18th party congress in November 2012 and 
many are wondering however he will change China’s foreign policy orientation or 
whether he will continue a the assertive policy started by his predecessor Hu in 
2009 (Feng & He, 2013, 209-210). Xi will claim power in China for the next ten 
years. 
An interesting phenomenon in the Chinese power politics is how decision-
makers really do not need to take actual popular responsible for their decisions 
(Chen & Zheng, 2009, 2-4). New leaders are selected within the CPC in a non-
institutionalized nor transparent manner and thus new candidates rather have to 
work for support within the party and its faction than towards the people. But the 
bigger influence of popular opinion and media is challenging this by gaining more 
and more ground in China and becoming more important to politics.  
 
ANALYSIS: The earlier times of strongman leadership is more or less gone 
and I believe that the decision-unit is a small group decision-unit. Looking at the 
more collective decision-making within the PSC and the two rivalry groups within 
the fifth generation would point toward a coalition as the decision-unit. But the 
notion and importance of unity within the PSC, and the Confucian paternalistic 
view on leadership and on collective decision-making would instead point toward 
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the small group decision-unit. So, emphasizing collective decision-making by 
Chinese terms is still more centred within the unit and with loyalty to the 
hierarchy within the unit.  
4.3.2 Confucianism 
A central question today is the relationship between Confucianism and democracy 
in modern China. Many different views lead to those who charge Confucianism 
for making a non-democratic form of governance just, and those who argue that 
Confucianism can justify a new form of Confucian democracy (Elstein, 2010, 
427). Both Chinese and western scholars discuss the compatibility of 
Confucianism and liberal values of e.g. democracy and human rights. Depending 
on versions and definitions of the two concepts some scholars argue them to be 
more or less working together whilst other deem them each other’s opposites. 
Sometimes argumentation about the incompatibility of democracy and 
Confucianism rather seem to aim to legitimize bad behaviour of Asian 
authoritarian governments (Stalnaker, 2013, 441). The rapid process of 
industrialization in China led to the rethinking of political tradition of academics 
and politicians again upholding Confucian heritage as a major value-bearer in the 
Chinese society influencing science, policy and behaviour (Lin, 2011, 38).  
Samuel P. Huntington proclaimed that the central values of Confucianism are 
incompatible to democratic values whilst Fukuyama offered a much more 
optimistic view in arguing that many central concepts within Confucianism are 
not only compatible, but actually promoting democracy (Baogang, 2010, 18). 
Though commonly within Chinese scholarly is to emphasize that Confucianism is 
multidimensional, just as democracy, and not conceptual monoliths, but rather 
differs in regard to versions, traditions and forms, making the two more, or less, 
compatible dependent on how you puzzle them together (Baogang, 2010).  
Confucianism is likely to have an impact on Chinese foreign policy and 
behaviour internationally, just as Protestant ethic had on the capitalist rise in 
Europe, according to Max Weber (See Zeng, 2011, 759). Modern neo-
Confucianism is traditional Confucianism developed to fit in a modern context, 
adapting notions of western learning such as democracy and individuality and 
rationality, though still keeping the essential base from traditional Confucianism 
(Chai, 2006, 379).  
Confucianism emphasizes a number of natural virtues that differentiate 
humans from animals (Chai, 2006, 367-368). The primal natural virtue is 
benevolence, which was an ethical core in historic China (Chai, 2006, 368-370). 
All other natural virtues, such as wisdom, justice and courage, are all connected 
and understood by understanding benevolence. Based on the notion of 
benevolence Confucianism diversifies between gentlemen and base-persons, and 
in extension in leadership (Chai, 2006, 372-373). The gentleman comprises the 
virtuous individual, being just, merciful, wise etcetera, and also officials in 
society, whilst the base person lacks the virtues of a gentleman being one of the 
common populace. The gentleman that is both an official and a benevolent person 
  46 
is the highest form of leadership, with good intentions, learns from its mistakes, 
acting selflessly (Ibid.). “It advocates that one’s daily behaviour ought to be 
guided by the rules of rites or propriety, not merely for restricting individuals, but 
more for the cultivation of the sense of holiness, not primarily for conquering, but 
more for co-operating with others to contribute to the harmony of the universe.” 
(Lin, 2011, 39).  
 
ANALYSIS: Confucianism may be an affective factor towards keeping the 
Chinese policies assertive but non-confrontational. As the notion of rule without 
ownership making China more assertive without necessarily ambitions to conquer 
militarily, since an annexation of military campaign necessarily would not gain.  
Confucianism also affects the leader to be a benevolent gentleman and not a 
brute; acting sophisticated but still maintains and protects Chinese values and 
interests. The disputed compatibility between Confucian and democratic values 
show a possible scenario of behaviour and decisions not related to the norm. 
Since norms and institutions stem from liberal democracies a Confucian toolbox 
would make other options available to the decision-maker.  
4.3.3 New Capacity 
According to Bitzinger the reason for the assertive and aggressive China is due to 
its enhanced military capacity and mainly the willingness to use the PLA in 
relation to their national interest (Bitzinger, 2011, 7). As seen in section 3.6.1 
about the PLA, the Chinese military has undergone a rapid transformation 
enhancing its capacity. Also civilian law-enforcement organizations in the 
maritime area have largely new capacities as well, as stipulated in earlier sections.  
 
ANALYSIS: The development of increasing the capacity of the PLA and naval 
law-enforcement agencies have given the PSC a whole set of new options to chose 
from when making decisions regarding their interests in the SCS, making it more 
assertive. Explaining the newfound assertiveness from the Organizational 
Behaviour perspective would point toward these organizations and their 
availability to the decision-unit as the explanatory factor for China’s new 
assertiveness.  
4.3.4 Influencing Decisions 
“Domestically, the PLA has long sustained the Chinese Communist Party in 
power and enforced internal security. In internal policy debates, the PLA is the 
hypernationalistic guardian of claimed Chinese territorial sovereignty and is the 
institution charged with enforcing these claims.” (Shambaugh, 1999, 52). 
The PLA has taken a stronger approach toward Chinese leadership politics 
influencing decisions also wanting a chair in the standing committee (Miller A., 
2011, 8). And both current president Xi and former presidents Hu, Deng and Jiang 
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have had key appointments in the CMC. The PLA’s interest are supposed to be 
catered by the PSC and have had limited presence in the politburo historically 
(Miller A., 2011, 6-8). Though PLA is still a strong force in Chinese politics and 
the president must gather military support to be elected (Miller A., 2014, 9). Thus, 
Xi frequently has visited military bases and PLA brass during his political career 
to, presumably, gather support and respect of the top PLA officials (Miller A., 
2014, 9-10). 
Today there is a comprehensive debate between military and academics about 
the function and aims of PLAN, if it should prioritize “local informatised wars” or 
global power projection to protect wider Chinese interests (Till, 2012, 223). 
Military circles in China strongly advocate a hedging strategy towards the other 
main players internationally to resist the, in Chinese eyes, containment of China 
by the U.S. and its allies in the region (Till, 2012, 21). The fifth generation 
Chinese leaders stem from different backgrounds than their predecessors in 
coming from the academic world (Chen & Zheng, 2009, 24-25). Both Li and Xi 
have an academic degree in respectively economics and social sciences, which 
make the more connected to scholars and academia making it a stronger influence 
on Chinese foreign policy. 
Also, national Chinese energy companies, especially in the oil industry, as 
CNOOC and CNPC are influencing the central committee for a more assertive 
behaviour in the South China Sea to acquire the hydrocarbon deposits (Lampton, 
2014, 80). 
 
ANALYSIS: Looking at the newfound assertiveness from the Governmental 
Politics perspective it would describe that new players have gained more power to 
affect the bureaucratic games. President Xi is deeply connected to the military, 
and with the rearmament, the PLA and its sub-divisions have grown in influence. 
The fifth generation also come from the academic world giving scholars and 
theories a greater impact on Chinese decision-making. The result of the games is 
the non-confrontational assertiveness assumed to be a compromise between 
players. Looking at the grander influence of the PLA would explain the 
assertiveness and whilst the non-confrontational part can be assumed to stem 
from academia and those who still emphasize Deng-ist strategies, with the activity 
of the maritime law-enforcement agencies being the compromise.  
4.3.5 Nationalism, Media & Popular Opinion 
Since the financial crisis in 2008 nationalist voices in China has risen both with 
the people and in media, which often exaggerates the Chinese status 
internationally (Christensen, 2011, 3-4). Even though Chinese power holders have 
a more sober view of China’s international status, the national uncertainty of CCP 
drives the standing committee toward more popular options (Ibid.). Nationalist 
pressure, and growing national instability related the national uncertainty of the 
CCP, forces the PSC to act in accordance toward “completing” China to its former 
grand (Fravel, 2010, 519).  
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Because the changing balance of power in Chinese favour the central 
committee more often find themselves in agreeing with popular notions of 
nationalism and thereby have become more actively complying with calls of 
popular nationalism (Jianwei & Xiaojie, 2014, 225). Nationalist appeals by the 
CPC have become an important strategy for the party’s survival, making military 
nationalism an increasingly important part in establishing domestic pride for the 
party (Till, 2012, 225). As Hu argued in a speech 2012, of international attempts 
to divide and westernize China he urge his fellow countrymen to “uphold China’s 
culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Yahuda, 2013, 455). 
Nationalism is rising and spreading in China, and especially among the 
members of the fifth generation now holding office in the politburo (Cheng, 2008, 
88). A form of popular ultra-nationalism is also rising in the nation both affecting 
and affected by the people’s opinions (Cheng, 2008, 93). Chinese children are 
integrated into this nationalism in early ages as themes of national unification and 
rightful claims are recurrent in schoolbooks alongside narratives of Mao’s 
struggles and warfare, and contemporary urbanized warfare (Yahuda, 2013, 454).  
“Nowadays the Chinese media can exercise greater influence on Chinese 
foreign policy making and implementation via information dissemination, interest 
and opinion articulation, and policy recommendations albeit that its effect is 
limited, given the primitive stage of the bi-directional relationship.” (Jianwei & 
Xiaojie, 2014, 234) Chinese leaders have become more influence by popular 
opinion on the web (Jianwei & Xiaojie, 2014, 223).  
Popular access to the process of Chinese politics has grown in relation to 
earlier (Cheng, 2008, 87). In earlier times the people came to know about conflicts 
within the party as the victor proclaimed the defeat of his adversaries. But today 
the party has a higher level of transparency and make themselves available to TV, 
radio and newspapers, making it possible for political individuals to demonstrate 
their position and opinion in different questions (Ibid.). This in turn is slowly 
opening up the Chinese power elite to popular consent in making decisions and 
more influenced by popular opinion.  
 
ANALYSIS: The popular opinion emphasising national pride and nationalism 
is, most probably, a big factor of the new assertiveness pursuing Chinese rise 
toward earlier grandness. Since these notions flow within the more influential 
popular opinion and the greater media coverage forces the PSC toward a strategy 
to satisfy the people whilst still not risking full-scale war.   
4.3.6 International Factors  
Internationally China has a bad external image, which affects its credibility and 
security (Cheng, 2008, 92). In China the financial crisis in 2008-2009 is regarded 
as the marking of decline of the U.S. and other western powers (Mingjiang, 2011, 
333). The start of the newfound assertiveness can be traced to Obama’s visit in 
China in 2009 where the U.S. and China signed agreements not to interfere and 
respect each other’s core interests (Feng & He, 2013, 229-230). Later the same 
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year the Obama administration received Dalai Lama in the White House and 
sanctioned arms deals with Taiwan, which made Chinese leaders furious charging 
the White House for failing in its commitments and threatening American 
companies operating in and with China (Ibid.).  
Also, during Obama’s visit to China in 2009 he called China to assist in global 
struggles (Yahuda, 2013, 447). This was regarded as a sign of weakness to the 
U.S. unipolarity, and the U.S. decline, and in relation to Chinese assumptions of 
U.S. containment of China, this was the start of the newfound assertiveness 
leaving Deng’s low-profile strategy toward a more assertive “get something 
accomplished”-notion, according to Michael Yahuda among many (2013, 447-
448). The U.S. and China are extremely dependent of each other in terms of trade 
and finance and probably have the most important bilateral relationship today 
(Shor, 2012, 158). China is the largest holder of US foreign reserves and the U.S. 
is the biggest receiver of Chinese exports, making the Chinese stakes in U.S. 
economy an important factor (Ibid.).  
Because of the U.S. dominance on the oil market, China has turned its 
business and attention towards oil-producing states currently hostile to the U.S., 
e.g. Sudan and Iran, since if China and the U.S. would end up in a state of 
conflict, suppliers are less likely to support the U.S. whereas China has secured its 
import quota (Chanis, 2011, 289). The U.S. has also declared the South China Sea 
as national interest and especially to keep the freedom of navigation in the area 
(Storey, 2011, 14). 
 
ANALYSIS: Chinese officials are aware of their new importance 
internationally. They have seen the start of the U.S. decline. This gives more room 
to pursue national interests and challenge U.S. dominance for the first time since 
the War of Liberation, which may be a factor for the newfound assertiveness. 
Though, their bad image makes it harder to pursue these national interests and 
interests in the U.S. limits their room for manoeuvre.  
4.4 Analysis 
Analysing China’s new assertiveness on the foreign policy level, letting the 
Organizational Behaviour and Governmental Politics models complement each 
other and introducing other factors that may influence the decision-making 
process gives valuable insights to add to those from the international relations 
level. Examining the new assertiveness on this level makes most point to the 
stronger militarism within China. The nationalist growth, PLA’s new capacity and 
influence strife for a more aggressive posture, while Deng-ist’s and academia urge 
for carefulness lead to a compromise of non-aggressive assertiveness. To make it 
as simple, but thorough, as possible see figure:  
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The outcomes of the decision making progress regarding foreign policies in 
the region is the non-confrontational assertiveness, which seem to be a 
compromise both in capacity and after bureaucratic games showing us a new 
method for China to reach a potential goal. In the next chapter these results will be 
combined and complemented with the results from the international systemic level 
of analysis.  
Media can monitor the PSC and the CPC to a higher extent than before 
making it more accessible to the population.
Chinese Core National Interests
Nationalism is growing and popular opinion has a bigger inﬂuence on 
policy-makers. 
The U.S. is declining giving more room for Chinese action to pursue na-
tional interests and to act nationalistic. 
PLA development is giving new options for the PSC for acting differently 
and adapting new Standard Operating Procedures.
A stronger PLA gets more inﬂuence arguing using them as the standard 
operating procedure in different situations offering to “get something ac-
complished”. 
Deng-ist’s, and academia argue for a less assertive and aggressive ap-
proach to the PLA’s. 
Confucianism urges benevolence but still make actions outside liberal 
norms and institutions available and legit.
Non-aggressive assertiveness with paramilitary forces is the 
outcome. 
The Politburo Standing Committee - a small group decision 
unit
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS
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5 Dual Level Analysis and Results  
My first question of this study – how does a regional hegemonic rise occur and 
affect the regional arena? – I tried to answer by portraying contemporary theories 
of hegemony related to RAM. It gave me the two dimensions of hard versus soft 
power and consent versus coercive, which would portray different versions or 
theories of hegemony. The first dimension about power seemed to be quite 
inadequate to understand China, based on China’s investment in both. While 
adapting China to the second dimension, China showed a more coercive posture 
but with a touch of consent related to the region. But to answer the question above 
a hegemonic rise would occur in either a grand development of hard or soft power 
and the will and capacity to dominate the regional arena, as shown in section 3.4.  
Which national factors of decision-making drive the state to pursue regional 
hegemonic status? This question is answered by relating to the goal of the state 
and the prevailing conditions for the decision-unit. Is the goal hegemony? In this 
case I believe it not. But rather the All-under-Heaven system that would take 
China back to earlier greatness. The changing conditions within the state can 
stimulate the pursuit since it gives decision-unit the equivalent tools and capacity 
to pursue this potential goal and new actors emphasising this new posture get 
more power to influence this pursuit.  
Understanding the All-under-Heaven system as the potential goal for the 
Chinese decision makers, combine with neo-mercantilist assumptions also vividly 
facilitates better understanding regarding Chinese decision-making and process of 
foreign policy. As model II and III showed that the PLA has grown both in 
influence and in capacity making the best explanation for the new Chinese 
assertive policies regionally. As the PSC is loosing ground to public opinion and 
media becomes a stronger force in society, the PLA thrive alongside nationalistic 
notions, making it stronger both quantitatively and qualitatively. Deng’s strategies 
have not been completely diminished and its advocates may still stipulate an 
internationally careful posture to challenge PLA influence. The All-under-Heaven 
system as a goal for the Chinese decision-makers would explain the new non-
confrontational assertiveness, the PLA’s new influence and activity related to 
model I, II and III.  
Combining the results from the two different levels on analysis portrays China 
quite interestingly. As western theories of hegemony stemming from the RAM is 
rather weak in explaining Chinese behaviour on the systemic level since empirics 
related to the theories is full of discrepancies and anomalies. Introducing a 
Chinese version of the international system, not accepting the notion of 
hegemony, the All-under-Heaven, is more connected to the Chinese behaviour 
and gives a better understanding of the coercive posture of China and the 
development of both soft and hard power combined. As the rise of China, and the 
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development behind it, make China more dependent of natural resources the core 
interests in the SCS become even more important for the PSC and PLA than just 
national pride. National pride is an extremely important factor as nationalism is 
growing in China affecting the policy-makers towards a more aggressive 
behaviour and a pursuit of earlier grandness.  
What signs are there to conclude that the assertiveness is related to a pursuit 
of hegemony? AND How can we understand and explain national decision-
making versus international behaviour behind China’s new assertiveness related 
to its supposed pursuit of hegemony and/or peaceful rise? AND Why has China 
changed its behaviour towards a new non-confrontational assertiveness?  
 Looking at the theoretical assumptions about hegemony there are several 
signs and factors that point towards a Chinese pursuit of regional hegemony, of 
course. Rearmament, aid-projects, coerciveness towards the region, the national 
public will towards former greatness, the challenging of liberal institutions, the 
challenging of the U.S., etcetera, all fit in the explanation of a Chinese hegemonic 
pursuit.  
But the constant rejection of a hegemonic China, by Chinese scholars and 
decision-makers, their non-interference policy and Confucian philosophy would 
still make me, as discussed earlier, reject the notion that the new assertiveness is 
connected to a hegemonic pursuit. In my view the All-under-Heaven system has 
stronger explanatory power than any theory of hegemony, based on my results on 
both the systemic and the foreign policy level. The All-under-Heaven system does 
not include a hegemon according to the Chinese. It would be easy to argue the 
similarities with hegemony but, as mentioned earlier, there are several essential 
differences. Especially the differences in entities between western and Chinese 
philosophy is essential for the Chinese to reject hegemony, since it does not fit in 
the All-under-Heaven system. By establishing an All-under-Heaven system in 
Southeast Asia, China would still be able to dominate the region as the Son-of-
Heaven but not necessarily as a hegemon but as the “world” instead of the 
contemporary “non-world”. It would theoretically be able to challenge western 
liberal institutions in favour of institutions stemming from the Son-of-Heaven, 
including neighbouring states into Chinese culture and development whilst still 
keeping their sovereignty, with the ability to change the international system.  
5.1.1 Final Discussion 
As mentioned earlier in this study, the Chinese rise is an extremely interesting 
occurrence and I believe it to be of, and to have, extreme importance 
internationally. In my view the most interesting thing is the potential effect on the 
international system. As mentioned several times during this paper, since, a 
dominant state, disregarding if it is a Son-of-Heaven or hegemony, can establish 
and create institutions, norms and thereby affect the international community 
gravely in its existence. Institutions or regimes today stem from liberal 
democracies, i.e. the U.S. and Britain, and China is not a liberal democracy. And 
by becoming the strongest and biggest economy in the world China have the 
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possibility to challenge the pax Americana liberal capitalist world order with their 
All-under-Heaven philosophy. Another factor is that China is showing other 
developing countries that development and democracy necessary do not go hand 
in hand and attract smaller developing countries to follow the Chinese neo-
authoritarian model. A pack of countries imitating the Chinese model would not 
be a positive turn from Washington’s perspective. 
Though it is important to note that China is still developing, and not able to 
dominate the region, with the U.S. presence, yet. China has caught up 
economically but still has a long way to go both e.g. militarily and socially. To 
further understand the phenomenon of rising China there are several fields within 
this paper that could be additionally examined and understood, that may have 
suffered from the aim of comprehensiveness of this study. The more China grows 
the more interesting phenomena will occur, be examined and understood. I regard 
the All-under-Heaven system as a very interesting subject for future research and 
especially related to western theories and philosophy and will probably be found 
in many hand- and schoolbooks of political science ahead. A deeper study into the 
development of the PLA and its increased capacity and influence would also make 
an interesting paper in itself. 
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